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The thesis explores general stochastic dierential games involving impulse controls and
ultimately investigates competition in dealer markets.
The work begins with the rst chapter on general non-zero stochastic dierential games
between an impulse controller and a stopper, providing the rst model of such class of
games using impulse controls. Nash equilibria are characterised through a verication
theorem, which identies a new system of quasi-variational inequalities whose solution
gives equilibrium payos with the correspondent strategies. Then, in order to show how
the verication theorem is meant to be applied, an example is shown and two dierent
types of Nash equilibrium are fully characterised. To conclude, some numerical results
describing the qualitative properties of both types of equilibrium are provided.
The dissertation continues with the second chapter on general zero-sum stochastic
dierential games with impulse controls. Here, two agents play feedback impulse control
strategies instead of strategies dened in an Elliot-Kalton fashion, as commonly done
in the literature, and are not allowed to apply impulses simultaneously, resulting in the
upper value and lower value functions of the game being naturally associated with the
cases in which either player has priority. The main objective is to apply the stochastic
Perron's method in order to have the game value function as the viscosity solution to
the double obstacle partial dierential equation arising from the problem after a viscosity
comparison result.
The third and nal chapter is about the study of competition in dealer markets. The
setting consists in two dealers trading at discrete times via market orders with price
impact, resulting in one of the rst nonzero-sum game with impulse controls applied to
optimal trading. Similarly to the rst chapter, a verication theorem identifying the
system of quasi-variational inequalities providing the equilibrium payo functions and
strategies is given. Furthermore, a framework to look for equilibria where both players
apply impulses simultaneously is introduced. This is very important as it is not possible
to nd equilibria when only one dealer trades at a time, whereas there exists at least a
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This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters presenting new results on zero and
nonzero-sum stochastic dierential games with impulse controls.
Stochastic dierential games constitute an interesting branch of mathematics as they
allow to model the interaction between two or more agents when this happens over a state
process evolving in continuous time. Two rms competing over their market shares, or
traders maximising their P&L through strategies based on the price process uctuations
are some of the possible examples of such interactions. This is one of the reasons why
they have been extensively studied since Isaacs' [50] pioneering work, although not much
attention has been paid to the case when players utilise impulse controls rather than
classic controls [1, 6, 9, 10, 31, 38, 43, 43, 63, 80]. Contrary to classic controls, which
allows agents to continuously modify the state process dynamics, i.e. drift and volatility,
impulse controls enable agents to induce a controlled jump, the impulse, on the state pro-
cess at strategically selected discrete times. As such they provide more realistic models,
especially when agents face xed and proportional costs of action, see the introductions
to Chapter 1, 2 and 3 for more details.
The thesis provides two general results on stochastic dierential games involving im-
pulse controls and one application to optimal trading in nancial markets.
Main contributions of Chapter 1:
(i) Formulation of the rst impulse controller vs stopper game.
(ii) Statement of a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities and the correspond-
ing verication theorem to nd Nash equilibria.
(iii) Example with characterisation of two dierent types of Nash equilibria.
(iv) Qualitative analysis of both types of equilibria.
Chapter 1 presents a nonzero-sum game between an impulse controller and a stopper.
This work is the rst in the class of controller vs stopper games, introduced by Maitra and
Sudderth [62], where the controller utilises impulse controls and it aims to inspire future
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research on its applications in nance, energy markets and real options. For instance, one
could think of the stopper as a social planner or regulator who decides when to optimally
shut down a business, the controller, which is maximising its prots manipulating either
the quantity of goods produced or their prices. The main mathematical contribution lies
on a system of quasi-variational inequalities and a verication theorem, inspired by [1],
to be used to nd Nash equilibria of such controller vs stopper games. Furthermore, the
chapter contains an example showing how the system of quasi-variational inequalities and
the verication theorem are meant to be applied, two dierent types of equilibria are
identied and fully characterised. To conclude, some numerical analysis is carried on to
investigate the qualitative properties of both types of equilibria.
Main contributions of Chapter 2:
(i) The stochastic Perron's method is adapted to stochastic dierential games with
impulse controls.
(ii) Symmetric formulation of the game where players use feedback impulse controls.
(iii) Comparison theorem for double obstacle partial dierential equations to guarantee
uniqueness of the viscosity solution.
In Chapter 2 a zero-sum game between two players playing impulse controls is studied
by mean of viscosity solution theory. This choice is due to the fact that the value function
is known to be non-smooth in most cases and viscosity solutions, introduced by Crandall
and Lions in 1980, represent a generalisation of the concept of classical solutions to partial
dierential equations that allows to nd solutions which don't need to be dierentiable
everywhere (smooth), see [39]. We look for such viscosity solutions via an adaptation of
the stochastic Perron's method approach by Bayraktar and Srbu [12, 15, 16, 74] as it
is arguably more tractable. Indeed, the dynamic programming principle is obtained as
a by-product. Moreover, the stochastic Perron's method is suitable to our denition of
feedback strategies [48, 74], according to which, players take their decisions based on the
evolution of the state process in an adapted fashion, resulting in a realistic and natural way
to model their interaction, especially if compared with the asymmetric Elliot and Kalton
formulation [42] commonly adopted in the literature. Finally, to guarantee uniqueness
of the viscosity solution, a verication by comparison result for double-obstacle partial
dierential equations is provided.
Main contributions of Chapter 3:
(i) Application of stochastic dierential games with impulse controls to optimal trading.
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(ii) Formulation of a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities and the corre-
sponding verication theorem to nd Nash equilibria when two players act simulta-
neously.
(iii) Characterisation of some equilibria.
Finally, Chapter 3 describes the competition between two dealers executing market
orders to maximise their revenues over a nite time horizon. Market orders are used by
traders to buy or sell a certain number of shares at a specic time at the best available
price. Financial markets are not perfectly liquid, this means that it is usually not possible
to buy or sell large amounts of shares at the same price as the market is made by a list of
oers to buy or sell xed numbers of shares at certain prices, called the limit order book.
So, for example, if the limit order book is composed by oers to sell 5 shares at ¿5, 4
shares at ¿6 and 3 at ¿7, then, a market order to buy 10 shares is completed as follows:
the rst 5 are purchased at ¿5, the best available price, the second 4 at ¿6, the next best
available price, and the nal 1 at ¿7. Therefore, it is not usually convenient to complete
large orders all at once as the bigger they are the higher the execution price is, due to
the order riding the limit order book to be fullled, as in the example, generating what
is usually called market impact. Given this set of characteristics, dealers' trades taking
place at strategically chosen discrete times and costs proportional to their sizes, it seems
natural to opt for an impulse control approach leading to the study of a nonzero-sum
game with impulse controls. The research is carried in a fashion similar to Chapter 1
and [1], after the game description, two suitable systems of quasi-variational inequalities
are provided together with the corresponding verication theorems to be used to search
for Nash equilibria. Notably, the chapter contains the rst system of quasi-variational
inequalities which allows to nd equilibria when both dealers trade simultaneously. This
is crucial for two reasons:
 rstly, because it breaks one of the current limits in the literature on stochastic
dierential games with impulse controls, since agents are not allowed to intervene
simultaneously in the existing models [1, 9, 10, 31, 38, 43, 43, 63, 80];
 secondly, because it is not possible to nd equilibria where only one dealer trade at
a time with this quasi-variational inequality approach.






games between an impulse controller
and a stopper
The content of this chapter is based on [30].
1.1 Introduction
Controller-stopper games are two-player stochastic dynamic games, whose payos depend
on the evolution over time of some state variable, one player can control its dynamics,
while the other player can stop the game. The study of these games started with Maitra
and Sudderth's work [62] on a zero-sum discrete time setting. Later on, many authors
investigated such games in continuous time, especially in the zero-sum case, while very
little has been done in the nonzero-sum. Indeed, apart from Karatzas and Sudderth
[54] and Karatzas and Li [53], all the other articles focus on the zero-sum case and
in all of them the controller uses regular controls, i.e. absolutely continuous for the
Lebesgue measure. Here, we mention Karatzas and Sudderth [55], who derived the explicit
solution for a game with a one-dimensional diusion with absorption at the endpoints of
a bounded interval as a state process; Karatzas and Zamrescu [57, 58] developed a
martingale approach to a general class of controller-stopper games, while Bayraktar and
Huang [12] showed that the value functions of such games is the unique viscosity solution
to an appropriate Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. Moreover, Hernandez et al. [47]
have analysed the case when the controller plays singular controls and derived a set of
variational inequalities characterising the games value functions. On the whole, this class
of games is motivated by a variety of applications in nance, insurance and economics. In
view of this, we quote Bayraktar et al. [13] on convex risk measures, Nutz and Zhang [65]
on sub-hedging of American options under volatility uncertainty, Bayraktar and Young
[17] on minimisation of lifetime ruin probability and Karatzas and Wang [56] on pricing
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and hedging of American contingent claims among others.
Here, we consider the case of a controller facing xed and proportional costs every
time she moves the state variable, so that intervening continuously over time is clearly
not feasible for her. In this context, the controller will make use of impulse controls, which
are sequences of interventions times and corresponding intervention sizes, describing when
and by how much will the controlled process be shifted. This kind of controls look like
the natural choice in many concrete applications, from nance to energy markets and to
real options. For this reason, they have been experiencing a comeback due to a demand
for more realistic nancial models (e.g. xed transaction costs and liquidity risk), see for
instance [8, 18, 27, 29, 35, 37, 61].
Impulse controls have been studied in stochastic dierential games as well and, as in
the controller-stopper case, most of the research has been done in the zero-sum framework.
For this reason, it is worth mentioning the work by Aïd et al. [1], who developed a general
model for non-zero sum impulse games implementing a verication theorem which provides
an appropriate system of quasi-variational inequalities for the equilibrium payos and
related strategies of the two players. Thereafter, Ferrari and Koch [43] produced a model
of pollution control where the two players, the regulator and the energy producer, are
assumed to face proportional and xed costs and, as such, play an impulse nonzero-sum
game which admits an equilibrium under some suitable conditions. Lastly, Basei et al. [9]
studied the mean eld game version of the nonzero-sum impulse game in [1] and proved
the existence of ε-Nash equilibrium for the corresponding N -player game. Regarding
the zero-sum case, here we quote Cosso [38], who examined a nite time horizon two-
player game where both players act via impulse control strategies and showed that such
games have a value which is the unique viscosity solution of the double-obstacle quasi-
variational inequality. Furthermore, Azimzadeh [6] considered an asymmetric setting with
one participant playing a regular control while the opponent is playing an impulse control
with pre-commitment, meaning that at the beginning of the game the maximum number
of impulses is declared, and proved that such a game has a value in the viscosity sense.
The content of this chapter is at the crossroad of the two streams of research we
have discussed above: stopper-controller games and impulse games. Indeed, we study an
impulse controller-stopper nonzero-sum game, focusing on the mathematical properties
of Nash equilibria, while application to economics and nance are postponed to future
research. Turning to the game's description, we consider a nonzero-sum stochastic dif-
ferential game between two players, P1 and P2, where P1 can use impulse controls to
aect a continuous-time stochastic process X while P2 can stop the game at any time.
When P1 does not intervene, we assume X to diuse according to a time homogeneous
multidimensional diusion process. Both players want to maximise their expected payos
which are dened for every initial state x ∈ Rd and every couple (u, η) featuring, P1's
intervention cost (gain for P2), running and terminal payos.
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We adopt a PDE-based approach to characterise the Nash equilibria of this game,
identifying a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs, for short) whose
solution will give equilibrium payos. One of the main contributions of this chapter
consists in the Verication Theorem 1.2.1 establishing that if two functions V1 and V2 are
regular enough and they are solution to the system of QVIs, then they coincide with some
equilibrium payo functions of the game and a characterisation of the related equilibrium
strategies is possible.
Furthermore, building on the verication theorem, we present an example of solvable
impulse controller and stopper game. More in detail, we consider a game with a one-
dimensional state variable X, modelled as a real-valued (scaled) Brownian motion. Both
players have linear running payos. When P1 intervenes, she faces a penalty while P2
faces a gain, both characterised by a xed and a variable part, proportional to the size
of the impulse. Moreover, when P2 stops the game, she may suer a loss proportional
to the state variable, while P1 might gain something proportional to X as well. Some
preliminary heuristics on the QVIs above leads us to consider two pairs of candidates for
the functions Vi. Then, a careful application of the verication theorem shows that such
candidates actually coincide with some equilibrium payo functions. In particular, we are
able to identify two kinds of Nash equilibria, both of threshold type, that can be shortly
described as follows:
(i) in the rst type of equilibrium, P1 intervenes when the state X is smaller than
some threshold x̄1 and moves the process to some endogenously determined target
x∗1, while P2 terminates the game when the state X is bigger than some x̄2; in this
kind of equilibrium the optimal target of P1, x∗1, is strictly smaller than x̄2, so the
two players intervene separately.
(ii) In the second type, P1 intervenes when the state X is smaller than some (possibly
dierent) threshold x̄1 and move the state variable to the intervention region of P2,
who is then forced by P1 to end the game. In this case, players' interventions are
simultaneous.
We provide quasi-explicit expressions for the value functions and for the thresholds x̄i,
x∗1 for both equilibria. Finally, we perform some numerical experiments providing several
cases when one of the two equilibria emerges. The question if there are cases when the
two types of equilibria can coexist is still open.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 gives the general formulation of impulse
controller and stopper game, in particular the notion of admissible strategies, and more
importantly we state and prove a verication theorem giving sucient condition in terms
of the system of QVIs for a given couple of payos to be a Nash equilibrium. In Section 1.3,
we consider the one-dimensional example with linear payos and provide quasi-explicitly
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characterisations for the two types of Nash equilibria sketched above. Finally, some
numerical experiments illustrate the qualitative behaviour of such equilibria.
1.2 Description of the Game
In this section, we have gathered all main theoretical results on a general class of nonzero-
sum impulse controller and stopper games. We start with a detailed description of the
game, together with all technical assumptions and the denition of admissible strategies.
Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space equipped with a complete and right-continuous
ltration F = (Ft)t≥0. On this space, we consider the uncontrolled state variable X ≡ Xx
dened as solution of the following time-homogeneous SDE:
dXt = b(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dWt, X0 = x, (1.1)
where (Wt)t≥0 is an F-Brownian motion and the coecients b : Rd → Rd and σ : Rd →
Rd×m are assumed to be globally Lipschitz continuous, i.e. there exists a constant C > 0
such that for all x1, x2 ∈ Rd we have:
|b(x1)− b(x2)|+ |σ(x1)− σ(x2)| ≤ C|x1 − x2|,
so that existence of a unique strong solution is granted and X is well-dened.
We consider two players, that we call P1 and P2. Equation (3.1) describes the evolution
of the state process in case of no intervention from both players. Let Z be a given subset
of Rd. During the game, P1 can aect X's dynamics applying some impulse δ ∈ Z in an
additive fashion, moving the state variable from its left limit at τ , Xτ−, to its new value











δn, t ≥ 0.
On the other hand, P2 can stop the game by choosing any stopping time η with values
in [0,∞]. We, now, give a proper denition of such strategies.
Definition 1.2.1 P1's strategy is any sequence u = (τn, δn)n≥0, where (τn)n≥0 is a se-
quence of stopping times such that 0 = τ0 < τ1 < τ2 < . . . < τn ↑ ∞ and δn ∈ L0(Fτn)
with values in Z. P2's strategy is any stopping time η ∈ T , where T is the set of all
[0,∞]-valued F-stopping times.
Remarks 1.2.1 We observe that simultaneous interventions are possible in this game.
This is in contrast with games where both players intervenes with impulses, where simul-
taneous interventions are usually not allowed since they would be very dicult to handle
with from a modelling perspective (cf. [1]). On the other hand here, due to the dierent
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nature of the strategies for the two players, one can safely allow for simultaneous actions.
This has an interesting consequence on our analysis, as we will see in the linear game of
the next section that at least two types of Nash equilibria are possible and in one of them
P1 induces P2 to stop instantaneously.
The players want to maximise their respective objectives, featuring each of them three
discounted terms: a running payo, P1's intervention cost/gain and a terminal payo.
The players' discount factors can be dierent of each other. More precisely, for each
i = 1, 2, ri > 0 denotes the discount rate of player i, f, g : Rd → R are their running
payos, h, k : Rd → R their terminal payos and φ, ψ : Rd × Z → R are the intervention
cost and gain, respectively. Throughout the whole chapter, we work under the assumption
that all these functions are continuous. Hence, we can dene the payos as follows.
Definition 1.2.2 Let x ∈ Rd, let (u, η) be a pair of strategies. Provided that the right-
hand sides exist and are nite we set:






e−r1τnφ(Xx,uτn−, δn) + e
−r1ηh(Xx,uη )1(η<∞)
]










where the subscript in the expectation denotes the conditioning with respect to the start-
ing point.
In order for J1 and J2 to be well dened, we now introduce the set of admissible
strategies.
Definition 1.2.3 Let x ∈ Rd be some initial state and let (u, η) be some strategy prole.
We say that the pair (u, η) is x-admissible if:












(ii) for each p ∈ N, the random variable ‖Xx,u‖∞ := supt≥0 e−(r1∧r2)t|X
x,u
t | is in Lp(Ω).
We denote by Ax the set of all x-admissible pairs.
Remarks 1.2.2 Notice that, as it is formulated above, admissibility is a joint condition
on the strategies of both players. Under condition (ii) above and if all functions f , g, h,
k, φ and ψ have at most polynomial growth in their respective variables, the set of all
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jointly admissible strategies can be expressed as A1x × A2x = Ax, where Aix denotes Pi's
set of (individually) admissible strategies for i = 1, 2, and is dened as follows: A1x is the
set of all P1's strategies u = (τn, δn)n≥0 such that
∑
n≥0 |δn| ∈ Lp(Ω) for all p ≥ 1, while
A2x is the set of all [0,∞]-values stopping times.
Indeed, for P1's strategies for instance, using classical a-priori Lp-estimates of the









≤ c(1 + E[‖X‖p∞]) <∞.
Moreover, similar estimates can be performed for the other expectations in Denition
1.2.3(i).
We conclude this section with the classical denition of Nash equilibrium and the
corresponding equilibrium payos.
Definition 1.2.4 (Nash Equilibrium) Given x ∈ Rd, we say that (u∗, η∗) ∈ Ax is a Nash
equilibrium if
J1(x;u
∗, η∗) ≥ J1(x;u, η∗), for all u s.t. (u, η∗) ∈ Ax,
J2(x;u
∗, η∗) ≥ J2(x;u∗, η), for all η s.t. (u∗, η) ∈ Ax.
Finally, the equilibrium payos of any Nash equilibrium (u∗, η∗) ∈ Ax are dened as
Vi(x) := Ji(x;u
∗, η∗), i = 1, 2.
1.2.1 The System of Quasi-Variational Inequalities
Now, we introduce the dierential problem that is satised by the equilibrium payo
functions of our game. Let V1, V2 : Rd → R be two measurable functions such that
{δ(x)} := argmaxδ∈Z{V1(x+ δ)− φ(x, δ)}, x ∈ Rd, (1.2)
for some measurable function δ : Rd → Z. Moreover, we dene the following two inter-
vention operators:
MV1(x) := V1(x+ δ(x))− φ(x, δ(x)), (1.3)
HV2(x) := V2(x+ δ(x)) + ψ(x, δ(x)), (1.4)
for each x ∈ Rd.
The expressions in (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4) have the following natural interpretation:
(1.2) let x be the current state of the process, if P1 intervenes immediately with impulse
δ(x), P1's payo after intervention changes to V1(x + δ(x)) − φ(x, δ(x)), given by
the payo in the new state minus the intervention cost. Therefore, δ(x) in (1.2) is
the optimal impulse that P1 would apply in case of intervention.
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(1.3) MV1(x) represents P1's payo just after her intervention.
(1.4) similarly, HV2(x) represents P2's payo following P1's intervention.
Moreover, for any functions V regular enough (specic assumptions will be given later)
we can consider the innitesimal generator of the uncontrolled state variable X:
AV := b · ∇V + 1
2
tr(σσ>D2V ),
where b, σ are as in (3.1), σ> denotes the transposed of σ, ∇V and D2V are the gradient
and the Hessian matrix of V , respectively. We are interested in the following quasi-
variational inequalities (QVIs, for short) for V1, V2:
MV1 − V1 ≤ 0 everywhere (1.5)
V2 − k ≥ 0 everywhere (1.6)
HV2 − V2 = 0 in {MV1 − V1 = 0} (1.7)
V1 = h in {V2 = k} (1.8)
max{AV1 − r1V1 + f,MV1 − V1} = 0 in {V2 > k} (1.9)
max{AV2 − r2V2 + g, k − V2} = 0 in {MV1 − V1 < 0} (1.10)
Each part of the QVIs system above can be interpreted in the following way:
(1.5) it means that it is not always optimal for P1 to intervene and it is a standard
condition in impulse control theory [24, 29];
(1.6) if the current state is x and P2 chooses to stop the game, i.e. η = 0, she gains k(x)
and since this is a suboptimal strategy, we have V2(x) ≥ k(x) for all x ∈ Rd;
(1.7) by denition of Nash equilibrium we expect that P2 does not lose anything when P1
intervenes as in [1], otherwise P2 would like to deviate, by contradicting the notion
of equilibrium;
(1.9) before P2 stops the game, P1 plays as in a classic impulse control problem (e.g.
[29]);
(1.10) similarly as above, when P1 does not intervene P2 solves his own optimal stopping
problem (e.g. [34]).
After all this preparation, we are ready to move to our main result, which is a verication
theorem linking Nash equilibria and solutions to the QVIs system above.
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1.2.2 The Verication Theorem
In this subsection, we state and prove our main verication theorem. This result will be
key in order to compute Nash equilibria in specic examples.
Theorem 1.2.1 Let V1, V2 : Rd → R be two given functions. Assume that (1.2) holds
and set
C1 := {MV1 − V1 < 0}, C2 := {V2 − k > 0},
withMV1 as in (1.3). Moreover, assume that:
 V1 and V2 are solutions of the system of QVIs;
 Vi ∈ C2(Cj \ ∂Ci) ∩ C1(Cj) ∩ C(Rd), for i 6= j, and both functions have at most
polynomial growth;
 ∂Ci is a Lipschitz surface, i.e. it is locally the graph of a Lipschitz function, and Vi's
second order derivatives are locally bounded near ∂Ci for i = 1, 2.
Finally, let x ∈ Rd and assume that (u∗, η∗) ∈ Ax, where u∗ = (τn, δn)n≥1 is given by
τn := inf{t > τn−1 : Xt ∈ Cc1}, {δn} := argmaxδ∈Z{V1(Xτn− + δ)− φ(Xτn−, δ)}, n ≥ 0,
and
η∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : V2(Xt) = k(Xt)},
with the convention τ0 = 0. Then, (u
∗, η∗) is a Nash Equilibrium and Vi = Ji(x;u
∗, η∗)
for i = 1, 2.
Remarks 1.2.3 First, we stress that, unlike usual control problems, the candidates V1, V2
are not required to be twice dierentiable everywhere, but only in {V2 > k} and {MV1−
V1 < 0} respectively. Moreover, we observe that for the equilibrium strategies in the
theorem above the right-continuity of (Xx;ut )t≥0 implies the following:
(MV1 − V1)(Xx,u
∗
s ) < 0, (1.11)
δk = δ(X
x,u∗
τk− ), (where δ(·) is as in (1.2)) (1.12)
(MV1 − V1)(Xx,u
∗
τk− ) = 0, (HV2 − V2)(X
x,u∗
τk− ) = 0 (1.13)
(V2 − k)(Xη∗) = 0, (on {η∗ < +∞}) (1.14)
(V2 − k)(Xs) > 0, (when P2 plays η∗) (1.15)
for every strategies u and η such that both (u∗, η), (u, η∗) belong to Ax, for every s ∈ [0, η)
and every τk <∞.
Proof 1.2.1 Let Vi(x) = Ji(x;u
∗, η∗) for i = 1, 2. By denition of Nash Equilibrium we
have to prove that V1(x) ≥ J1(x;u, η∗) and V2(x) ≥ J2(x;u∗, η) for every (u, η) such that
both (u∗, η), (u, η∗) belong to Ax. The proof is performed in three steps.
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Step 1 : We show that V1(x) ≥ J1(x;u, η∗). Let u be a strategy such that (u, η∗) ∈ Ax.
Thanks to the regularity assumptions and by approximation arguments of Theorem 2.1
in [67] (for more details see the proof of Theorem 3.3 in [1]), we can assume without loss
of generality that V1 ∈ C2(C2) ∩ C(Rd). For each r > 0 and n ∈ N, we set
τr,n := τr ∧ n ∧ η∗
with τr := inf{s > 0 : Xs 6∈ B(x, r)}, where B(x, r) is an open ball with radius r and
centre in x. As usual, we adopt the convention inf ∅ = +∞. Applying Itô's formula to













From (1.10) it follows that
(AV1 − r1V1)(Xs) ≤ −f(Xs)
for all s ∈ [0, η∗). Moreover, using (1.5) we also have:
V1(Xτk−) ≥MV1(Xτk−) ≥ V1(Xτk− + δ)− φ(Xτk−, δ) = V1(Xτk)− φ(Xτk−, δ).
Therefore,
V1(x) ≥ Ex












≤ C (1 + ‖X‖p∞) ∈ L1(Ω),
for some constants C > 0 and p ∈ N. Thus, we can use dominated convergence theorem













Step 2 : We show that V2(x) ≥ J2(x;u∗, η). Let η be a [0,∞]-valued stopping time such
that (u∗, η) ∈ Ax. Thanks to regularity assumptions and by the same approximation
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argument as before, we can assume again without loss of generality that V2 ∈ C2(C1) ∩












for the localising sequence τr,n := τr ∧ n ∧ η (r > 0, n ∈ N), where τr := inf{s > 0 : Xs 6∈
B(x, r)}. From (1.9) it follows that
(AV2 − r2V2)(Xs) ≤ −g(Xs)
for all s ∈ [0, η). Moreover, due to (1.7) and (1.13) we obtain
V2(Xτk−) = HV2(Xτk−) = V2((Xτk− + δk) + ψ((Xτk−, δk) = V2(Xτk) + ψ(Xτk−, δk).
Then,
V2(x) ≥ Ex







and as before we can use dominated convergence theorem and pass to the limit so that












Step 3 : Let V1(x) = J1(x;u
∗, η∗). We argue as in Step 1, with equalities instead of
inequalities by the property of u∗. Similarly for P2 with V2(x) = J2(x;u
∗, η∗). 
1.3 An Impulse Controller-Stopper Game with Linear
Payos
In the next Sections 1.3.1-1.3.4, we provide an application of the verication theorem,
Theorem 1.2.1, to an impulse game with a one-dimensional state variable evolving es-
sentially as a Brownian motion, which can be shifted by P1's impulses and stopped by
P2, and where both players want to maximise linear payos. We nd two types of Nash
equilibria for this game, depending on whether P1 nds it convenient or not to force P2 to
stop the game. For both types, we provide quasi-explicit expressions for the equilibrium




We are in a more specic setting than before. This time, the state variable is one-
dimensional, while the players have the following linear payos for x ∈ R:
f(x) := x− s, φ(x) := c+ λ|δ|, h(x) := ax,
g(x) := q − x, ψ(x) := d+ γ|δ|, k(x) := −bx,
with s, c, λ, a, q, d, γ, b positive constants fullling
a < λ and b < γ. (1.16)
Hence, given an initial state x and an impulse strategy u = (τn, δn)n≥1, we dene the
controlled process Xx;ut as
Xt = X
x;u
t = x+ σWt +
∑
n:τn≤t
δn, t ≥ 0,
where W is a standard one dimensional Brownian motion and σ > 0 is a xed parameter.
Moreover, we assume that the two players have the same discount factor r1 = r2 = r such
that
1− λr > 0 and 1− br > 0. (1.17)
The players' payo functions are given by






e−rτn(c+ λ|δn|) + ae−rηXη1{η<∞}
]
,









Therefore, in this game P1 can shift the state variable X by intervening with impulses
in order to keep it high enough, while paying some costs at each intervention time, until
the end of the game, which is decided by P2. In addition to that, P2, who wants to keep
X low, might gain something each time P1 intervenes. At the end of the game, P1 (resp.
P2) receives (resp. loses) some amount proportional to X. Hence, depending on whether
her terminal payo is high enough, P1 might want to end the game soon, by forcing P2
to do that.
Our goal is to nd some Nash equilibrium by solving the QVIs problem in (1.5)-(1.10).
More specically, a heuristic analysis of the QVIs system will help us nding a couple of
quasi-explicit candidates W1, W2 for the equilibrium payo functions of the game V1, V2.
We recall the optimal impulse size and the intervention operators in this setting
{δ(x)} = argmaxδ∈Z {W1(x+ δ)− c− λ|δ|} ,
MW1(x) = W1(x+ δ(x))− c− λ|δ(x)|,
HW2(x) = W2(x+ δ(x)) + d+ γ|δ(x)|,
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together with the innitesimal generator of the uncontrolled state variable
AV (x) = 1
2
σ2V ′′(x), x ∈ R.
Before giving the QVIs system in this case, let us introduce the continuation regions for
both players
C1 = {x ∈ R : W1(x+ δ(x))− c− λ|δ(x)| < W1(x)},
C2 = {x ∈ R : W2(x) + bx > 0},
so that the respective intervention regions are given by Cci for i = 1, 2. Now, the QVIs
system becomes
W1(x+ δ(x))− c− λ|δ(x)| −W1(x) ≤ 0, x ∈ R,
W2(x)− bx ≥ 0, x ∈ R,
W2(x+ δ(x)) + d+ γ|δ(x)| −W2(x) = 0, x ∈ Cc1,





W ′′2 (x)− rW2(x) + q − x,−xb−W2(x)
}





W ′′1 (x)− rW1(x) + x− s, (MW1 −W1)(x)
}
= 0, x ∈ C2.
A rst look at the system suggests the following representation for W1 and W2:
W1(x) =

ax x ∈ Cc2
ϕ1(x) x ∈ C1 ∩ C2




−bx x ∈ Cc2
ϕ2(x) x ∈ Cc1 ∩ C2
HW2(x) x ∈ Cc1 ∩ C2,
(1.19)
where ϕ1 and ϕ2 are solution to the ODEs
1
2
σ2ϕ′′1(x)− rϕ1(x) + x− s = 0,
1
2
σ2ϕ′′2(x)− rϕ2(x) + q − x = 0. (1.20)












where C11, C12, C21, C22 are real parameters and θ :=
√
2r/σ2.
1.3.2 An Equilibrium with no Simultaneous Interventions
In this subsection, we push our heuristics further by focusing on a rst type of Nash
equilibrium, where simultaneous interventions are not allowed. By this we mean that we
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are looking for an equilibrium of threshold type, where P1 intervenes each time X falls
below a certain level, say x̄1, in which case P1 applies an impulse moving the state variable
towards an optimal level x∗1 belonging to the continuation region of both players. On the
other hand, P2 waits until X is too high for her, i.e. until X crosses some upper level,
say x̄2, at which point P2 decides to stop the game. The heuristics will lead us to propose
candidates for the equilibrium payos and related strategies, which will be then checked
to be the correct ones subject to some additional conditions. Such additional conditions
will be checked in some numerical examples.
Heuristics. Loosely speaking, since P1 is happy when X is high while P2 prefers it to
be low, we make the following ansatz about the continuation regions:
Cc1 = (−∞, x̄1] (P1 intervenes),
C1 ∩ C2 = (x̄1, x̄2) (no one intervenes),
Cc2 = [x̄2,∞) (P2 intervenes).
Hence, we can rewrite (1.18)-(1.19) as
W1(x) =

ax, x ∈ [x̄2,+∞)
ϕ1(x), x ∈ (x̄1, x̄2)




−bx, x ∈ [x̄2,+∞)
ϕ2(x), x ∈ (x̄1, x̄2)
HW2(x), x ∈ (−∞, x̄1].
(1.23)
Let us nd more explicit expressions for the operatorsMW1 and HW2. In this example,
it is natural to restrict the analysis to δ ≥ 0 since P1 prefers high values of Xx,u. Hence,
whenever she intervenes she will always move the process X to the right, so that
MW1(x) = sup
δ≥0
{W1(x+ δ)− c− λ|δ|} = sup
y≥x
{W1(y)− c− λ(y − x)} .
Here, we focus on the case where the maximum point belongs to (x̄1, x̄2), in other words







{ϕ(y)− λy} , i.e. ϕ′1(x∗1) = λ, ϕ′′1(x∗1) ≤ 0, x̄1 < x∗1 < x̄2.
Therefore, we obtain
MW1(x) = ϕ1(x∗1)− c− λ(x∗1 − x), HW2(x) = ϕ2(x∗1) + d+ γ(x∗1 − x).
The parameters appearing in the expressions for W1 and W2 must be chosen so as to
satisfy the regularity assumptions in the verication theorem, i.e.
W1 ∈ C2((−∞, x̄1] ∪ (x̄1, x̄2)) ∩ C1((−∞, x̄2]) ∩ C(R),
W2 ∈ C2((x̄1, x̄2) ∪ (x̄2, +∞)) ∩ C1([x̄1, +∞)) ∩ C(R).
We can summarise the description of our candidates for equilibrium payos in the following
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Ansatz 1.3.1 Let W1 and W2 be as in (1.22)-(1.23) where the parameters involved
(C11, C12, C21, C22, x̄1, x̄2, x
∗
1)
satisfy the order condition
x̄1 < x
∗
1 < x̄2, (1.24)
and the following equations
ϕ′1(x
∗
1) = λ and ϕ
′′(x∗1) ≤ 0 (optimality of x∗1),
ϕ′1(x̄1) = λ (C
1-pasting in x̄1),
ϕ′2(x̄2) = −b (C1-pasting in x̄2),
ϕ1(x̄1) = ϕ(x
∗
1)− c− λ(x∗1 − x̄1) (C0-pasting in x̄1),




1) + d+ γ(x
∗
1 − x̄1) (C0-pasting in x̄1),
ϕ2(x̄2) = −bx̄2 (C0-pasting in x̄2).
(1.25)
Re-parametrisation. We will conveniently re-parametrise the equations above in order






















































































































































× (e−θx̄1 − e−θx∗1) + 1− γr
r
(x∗1 − x̄1)− d = 0 (1.28c)
Now, the change of variable z = eθ(x
∗
1−x̄1) turns equation (1.28a) into the following












that it satises F ′(z) > 0 for all z > 1. Moreover z = eθ(x
∗
1−x̄1) > 1 due to the order
condition (1.24), F (1) < 0 and limz→+∞ F (z) = +∞. Therefore, there is only one value
z̃ such that F (z̃) = 0, which can be easily computed numerically.
Now, in order to solve (1.28b) and (1.28c) we perform a second change of variable,










































ln z̃ − d = 0. (1.30b)













Regarding (1.30b), it can be rewritten as
w4
(1− br)(1− λr)



















ln z̃ − rd
)
− (1− br)(1− λr)














θ(1− ar)(z̃ + 1)
= 0. (1.32)
The equation for w above is a quartic equation for which explicit formulae for its roots
are available. However, since they are quite cumbersome and not easy to use, we will
solve it numerically, leaving the analysis for later. Once the two new parameters z̃ and
w̃ are found, by solving numerically the respective equations above, the thresholds x̄1, x̄2
and the optimal level for P1, x∗1, can be deduced automatically. It remains to check
under which additional conditions such thresholds correspond to a Nash equilibrium of
our original linear game. This will be done in the next paragraph.
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Characterisation of the equilibrium and verication. The next proposition sum-
marises our ndings and establish the link between the solutions z̃ and w̃ to the equations
above with the Nash equilibrium of threshold type we are looking for, provided some
additional inequalities are fullled.
Proposition 1.3.1 Assume that there exists a solution (z̃, w̃) to (1.29)-(1.32) such that
1 < z̃ < w̃ and additionally
0 ≤ (1− br)(1− λr)(w̃
2 − z̃)
















(w̃ − 1)2 + 1− br
θ
(1 + 2w̃ ln w̃ − w̃2) > 0. (1.34)
Then, a Nash equilibrium for the game in Section 1.3 exists and it is given by the pair
(u∗, η∗), where u∗ = (τn, δn)n≥1 is dened by
τn := inf {t > τn−1;Xt ∈ (−∞, x̄1]} , δn := (x∗1 − x)1(−∞,x̄1](x),
and
η∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ [x̄2, +∞)},
where the thresholds x̄1, x
∗
1 and x̄2 satisfy
x∗1 = x̄2 +
ln z − lnw
θ














Moreover, the functions W1, W2 in Ansatz 1.3.1 coincide with the equilibrium payo
functions V1, V2, i.e.
V1 ≡ W1, and V2 ≡ W2.
Proof 1.3.1 The proof consists in checking all the conditions needed to apply the Ver-
ication Theorem (1.2.1). First, notice that by construction the functions W1 and W2
satisfy all required regularity properties, i.e. W1 and W2 have polynomial growth and
W1 ∈ C2 ((−∞, x̄2) \ {x̄1}) ∩ C1 ((−∞, x̄2)) ∩ C(R),
W2 ∈ C2 ((x̄1,+∞) \ {x̄2}) ∩ C1 ((x̄1,+∞)) ∩ C(R).
Moreover Lemmas 1.A.1 and 1.A.2 in the Appendix grant the optimality of the impulse
δ(x), i.e.
{δ(x)} = argmaxδ∈Z {W1(x+ δ)− c− λ|δ|}
together with the properties
MW1 −W1 ≤ 0, W2(x) + bx ≥ 0, x ∈ R.
Next, we show that for all x ∈ {MW1−W1 = 0} = (−∞, x̄1], we have W2(x) = HW2(x).
Indeed, by denition of HW2 we have:
HW2(x) = W2(x+ δ(x)) + d+ γ|δ(x)| = W2(x∗1) + d+ γ(x∗1 − x)
= ϕ2(x
∗
1) + d+ γ(x
∗
1 − x) = W2(x) ∀x ∈ (−∞, x̄1].
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Now, let x ∈ {MW1 −W1 < 0}. We have to prove that
max{AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x, −bx−W2(x)} = 0.
Since {MW1 −W1 < 0} = (x̄1, +∞), we can consider two separate cases. In (x̄1, x̄2) we
have −bx−W2(x) < 0 and
AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x = Aϕ2(x)− rϕ2(x) + q − x = 0,
since ϕ2 is solution to the ODE (1.20). On the other hand, in [x̄2, +∞) we know that
−bx = W2(x), then we have to check that AW2(x) − rW2(x) + q − x ≤ 0 for all x ∈
[x̄2, +∞). First, notice that W2(x) = −bx and AW2(x) = 0. Hence, we are reduced to
checking the inequality
AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x = brx+ q − x = q − (1− br)x ≤ 0. (1.35)
Since by assumption 1− br > 0, the function x 7→ q − (1− br)x is decreasing, so we just
need to check whether the inequality holds in x̄2, i.e. (1− br)x̄2− q ≥ 0 which is satised
by (1.33).
To conclude our verication that the candidate equilibrium payos satisfy the QVIs
system, we are left with checking that −bx −W2(x) = 0 implies W1(x) = ax, and that,
on the other side, −bx−W2(x) < 0 implies
max{AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s,MW1(x)−W1(x)} = 0.
Now, the rst implication holds by denition, while the second one boils down to proving
max{AW1(x)− rW2(x) + x− s,MW1(x)−W1(x)} = 0, x ∈ (−∞, x̄2).
For x ∈ (x̄1, x̄2) we haveMW1(x)−W1(x) < 0 and, as before,
AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s = Aϕ1(x)− rϕ1(x) + x− s = 0
as ϕ1 is solution to the ODE (1.20). For x ∈ (−∞, x̄1], we know thatMW1(x)−W1(x) = 0
and therefore we have to check that
AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s ≤ 0, x ∈ (−∞, x̄1].
To do that, recall rst that W1(x) = ϕ1(x
∗
1)− c−λ(x∗1− x) and AW1(x) = 0, which gives
AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s = −rϕ1(x̄1)− rλ(x− x̄1) + x− s
since ϕ1(x̄1) = ϕ1(x
∗
1)− c− λ(x∗1 − x̄1). Notice that, since by assumption 1− λr > 0, the
function x 7→ −rϕ1(x̄1)− rλ(x− x̄1) + x− s is increasing in x. As a result, we only need
to prove that the desired inequality holds for x = x̄1, i.e.
−rϕ1(x̄1) + x̄1 − s ≤ 0,
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which is veried since Aϕ1(x̄1)−rϕ1(x̄1)+ x̄1−s = 0 and Aϕ1(x̄1) = rϕ1(x̄1)− x̄1 +s ≥ 0,
due to ϕ′′1(x̄1) ≥ 0.
To nish the proof, we check that equilibrium strategies are x-admissible for every
x ∈ R. By construction, the controlled process never exits from (x̄1, x̄2) ∪ {x}, so that
supt≥0 e
−rt|Xt| ∈ Lp(Ω) holds. It is easy to check that all the other conditions are satised







To start, let us assume that the initial state x is x∗1. The idea is to write τk as a sum
of independent and identically distributed copies of some exit time (as in the proof of
Proposition 4.7 in [1]). Denote by µ the exit time of the process x∗1 + σW from (x̄1, x̄2),
where W is a one-dimensional Brownian motion. Then, each time τk can be decomposed
as τk =
∑k
l≥1 ζl, where ζl are i.i.d. random variables with the same law as µ. We can now
show (1.36). As δk = δ1 = x
∗











































which is a convergent geometric series, since µ > 0. Then, for any x ∈ (x̄1, x̄2) same
arguments hold whereas, when x ∈ [x̄2, +∞), P2 stops as soon as the game starts and,
as a consequence, P1 cannot apply any impulse, hence, the condition is satised. Finally,












since supt≥0|Xt| ∈ Lp(Ω). 
1.3.3 An Equilibrium where the Controller Activates the Stopper
We turn now to another kind of Nash equilibrium, where P1 behaves similarly as in the
previous type with the main dierence that this time when the state variable X falls
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below a given threshold, she will intervene and send X directly to the stopping region
of P2, hence forcing her to stop the game instantaneously. In particular, this would be
an equilibrium in which the two players act at the same time. The approach we use to
characterise such an equilibrium follows the same steps as in the previous subsection.
Heuristics. We start with some heuristics leading us to formulate a conjecture on the
equations the thresholds characterising this equilibrium should reasonably satisfy. Argu-





ϕ1(x) in (x̄1, x̄2)





ϕ2(x) in (x̄1, x̄2)
HW2(x) in (−∞, x̄1]
(1.38)
for suitable thresholds x̄i, i = 1, 2.
Now, according to the type of equilibrium we want to identify, we investigate the
case in which the maximum point of the function y 7→ W1(y)− λy belongs to [x̄2, +∞),
meaning that when P1 intervenes she is applying an optimal impulse moving the state




Therefore, we have the following scenarios:
 if a > λ ⇒ x∗1 →∞;
 if a = λ ⇒ x∗1 could be any x ≥ x̄2;
 if a < λ ⇒ x∗1 = x̄2.
Clearly, the only interesting case is a < λ, so that x∗1 = x̄2. As a consequence, this type
of equilibrium will be characterised only by two thresholds. Similarly as in the previous
subsection, we characterise the parameters (C11, C12, C21, C22) and the thresholds (x̄1, x̄2)
by exploiting the smooth pasting conditions coming from the regularity assumptions pos-
tulated in Theorem 1.2.1. By doing so, we obtain
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ϕ′1(x̄1) = λ (C
1-pasting in x̄1),
ϕ1(x̄2) = ax̄2 (C
0-pasting in x̄2),
ϕ1(x̄1) = ax̄2 − c− λ(x̄2 − x̄1) (C0-pasting in x̄1),
ϕ′2(x̄2) = −b (C1-pasting in x̄2),
ϕ2(x̄2) = −bx̄2 (C0-pasting in x̄2),
ϕ2(x̄1) = −bx̄2 + d+ γ(x̄2 − x̄1) (C0-pasting in x̄1).
(1.39)
together with the order condition x̄1 < x̄2.
Re-parametrisation. We rst rewrite (1.39) as
θC11e
































= (γ − b)x̄2 + d− γx̄1 (1.40f)
Then, dividing (1.40a) by θ and adding it to (1.40d), we can solve the equation for
C11 and consequently nd C12 as in the previous case, (1.27). A similar manipulation of

































































(1− ar)x̄2 − s
r
= 0.
This is a linear equation in x̄2, yielding
x̄2 =
(1− λr)((lnw − 1)w2 + lnw + 1)− crθ(w2 + 1)














2(θrd− (1− γr) lnw)w
θ(1− br)(w − 1)2
. (1.42)
Then, by equating (1.41) to (1.42), we obtain an equation in w:
G(w) :=
(1− λr)((lnw − 1)w2 + lnw + 1)− crθ(w2 + 1)






− w + 1
θ(w − 1)
− 2(θrd− (1− γr) lnw)w
θ(1− br)(w − 1)2
= 0 (1.43)
which has at least a solution, say ŵ > 1, due to limw→+∞G(w) = +∞ and limw→1G(w) =
−∞. The rst limit follows from the highest order term, w2 lnw, being multiplied by
1−λr














Characterisation of the equilibrium and verication. The next proposition sum-
marises our characterisation of this Nash equilibrium in terms of only one parameter, ŵ,
provided some further conditions, that will be checked numerically in the next subsection.
Proposition 1.3.2 Assume that there exists ŵ solution to (1.43) such that
(1− λr)(ŵ − ŵ ln ŵ − 1) + crθŵ > 0, (1.44)
0 ≤ (1− br)(ŵ2 − 1) + 2(θrd− (1− γr) ln ŵ)ŵ < (1− br)(ŵ − 1)2. (1.45)
Then, a Nash equilibrium for the game in Section 1.3 exists and it is given by the strategies
(u∗, η∗), with u∗ = (τn, δn)n≥1 dened by
τn := inf {t > τn−1;Xt ∈ (−∞, x̄1]} , δn := (x̄2 − x)1(−∞,x̄1](x)
and
η∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ∈ [x̄2, +∞)},
where the thresholds satisfy










2(θrd− (1− γr) ln ŵ)ŵ
θ(1− br)(ŵ − 1)2
.
Moreover, the functions W1, W2 in Ansatz 1.3.1 coincide with the equilibrium payo
functions V1, V2, i.e.
V1 ≡ W1 and V2 ≡ W2.
Proof 1.3.2 We proceed as for the previous equilibrium, by checking all the conditions
necessary to apply the verication theorem. First of all, the functions W1,W2 satisfy by
construction all required regularity properties, i.e.
W1 ∈ C2 ((−∞, x̄2) \ {x̄1}) ∩ C1 ((−∞, x̄2) ) ∩ C(R),
W2 ∈ C2 ((x̄1,+∞) \ {x̄2}) ∩ C1 ((x̄1,+∞) ) ∩ C(R)
35
and both have at most polynomial growth.
Next, Lemmas 1.A.3 and 1.A.4 give
{δ(x)} = argmaxδ∈Z {W1(x+ δ)− c− λ|δ|}
together with
MW1(x)−W1(x) ≤ 0, W2(x) + bx ≥ 0,
for all x ∈ R. Let x ∈ {MW1 −W1 = 0} = (−∞, x̄1]. By denition of HW2 we have:
HW2(x) = W2(x+ δ(x)) + d+ γ|δ(x)| = W2(x̄2) + d+ γ(x̄2 − x)
= −bx̄2 + d+ γ(x̄2 − x) = W2(x).
Now, in order to prove that
max{AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x, −bx−W2(x)} = 0, x ∈ (x̄1, +∞),
we consider two separate cases as for the previous equilibrium. First, for x ∈ (x̄1, x̄2), we
have −bx−W2(x) < 0 and
AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x = Aϕ2(x)− rϕ2(x) + q − x = 0
since ϕ2 is solution to the ODE (1.20), so the maximum between the two terms is zero.
Second, we know that −bx = W2(x) for x ∈ [x̄2, +∞), then we have to check that
AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x ≤ 0 for any x ∈ [x̄2, +∞). Since AW2(x) = 0, we are reduced
to verify the inequality
AW2(x)− rW2(x) + q − x = brx+ q − x = q − (1− br)x ≤ 0. (1.46)
Given that x 7→ q − (1 − br)x is decreasing due to 1 − br > 0, it suces to show the
inequality above at the point x̄2, i.e. (1− br)x̄2 − q ≥ 0, which is implied by (1.45).
To complete the verication that W1,W2 are solutions to the QVIs system, we show that
in −bx−W2(x) = 0 implies W1(x) = ax and that −bx−W2(x) < 0 yields
max{AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s,MW1(x)−W1(x)} = 0.
The rst implication holds by denition. For the second one, we have to prove
max{AW1(x)− rW2(x) + x− s,MW1(x)−W1(x)} = 0, x ∈ (−∞, x̄2).
For x ∈ (x̄1, x̄2) we haveMW1(x)−W1(x) < 0 and as before
AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s = Aϕ1(x)− rϕ1(x) + x− s = 0
as ϕ1 is solution to the ODE (1.20). For any x ∈ (−∞, x̄1] we know that MW1(x) −
W1(x) = 0, hence, we have to check that
AW1(x)− rW1(x) + x− s = (1− λr)x+ cr − s− (a− λ)rx̄2 ≤ 0, x ∈ (−∞, x̄1].
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To do so, we notice that the function x 7→ (1− λr)x+ cr − s− (a− λ)rx̄2 is increasing in
x by assumption 1−λr > 0. Therefore, we only need to prove that the desired inequality




lnw + cr − s ≤ 0,
which is given by Lemma 1.A.3. Finally, the optimal strategies are x-admissible for every
x ∈ R. Indeed, by construction, the controlled process never exits from (x̄1, x̄2) ∪ {x},
and, as a consequence, supt≥0 e
−rt|Xt| ∈ Lp(Ω) holds for all p ≥ 1. It is easy to check that
all the other conditions are satised as in the rst type of equilibrium. 
1.3.4 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we will give some numerical illustrations of the equilibrium payo functions
and a selection of comparative statics regarding the two types of Nash equilibria identied
in the previous subsections (the numerical results in this section were obtained using R,
rootSolve package). It is useful to remember that in order for the solutions to the QVIs
system to be Nash equilibria of one of the two types, they have to satisfy either (1.33)-
(1.34) or (1.44)-(1.45). Before we start, let us recall the meaning of the parameters
involved:
 s and q might be interpreted as exogenous costs and gains, respectively. Note that
P1's running payo f(x) = x − s, hence, in order to make prot P1 needs x to
be greater than s, which can fairly be considered as P1's expense, an analogous
reasoning applies for P2, but in the opposite direction since g(x) = q − x;
 a and b can be considered as terminal payo sensitivity to the underlying process,
Xt, as we have h(x) = ax and k(x) = −bx respectively;
 at each intervention time P1 faces a xed cost, c, while P2 receives a xed gain, d;
 moreover, λ is P1's proportional cost parameter, while γ is P2's proportional gain
parameter;
 nally, r is the discount rate, the same for both players, and σ is the volatility of
the state variable.
Equilibrium 1: no simultaneous interventions. In order to fulll (1.33)-(1.34),
we can observe that both inequalities are satised for high enough values of w̃. It is
possible to show via graphical analysis that w̃, solution to (1.32), is decreasing in a, b, s
and increasing in c, d, q, λ and γ. Therefore, we have chosen small values of a, b and s to
obtain the rst equilibrium, Scenario A, whereas for Scenario B we have looked for higher
values and increased q and d in order to nd an equilibrium. The table below provides
the exact parameter settings, with x̄1, x
∗
1 and x̄2 are as in Proposition 1.3.1:
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r σ c d λ γ a b s q x̄1 x
∗
1 x̄2
Scenario A 0.01 5 500 100 20 40 0 0 1 5 -31.11 16.95 34.84
Scenario B 0.01 1.5 50 150 10 15 2 8 10 10 4.95 14.26 18.18.
(i) x 7→V1(x) in red, x 7→V2(x) in blue for Sce-
nario A
(ii) x 7→ V1(x) in red, x 7→ V2(x) in blue for
Scenario B
(iii) c 7→ x̄1, x∗1, x̄2 for Scenario B (iv) λ 7→ x̄1, x∗1, x̄2 for Scenario B
(v) d 7→ x̄1, x∗1, x̄2 for Scenario B (vi) γ 7→ x̄1, x∗1, x̄2 for Scenario B
Figure 1: Type I Equilibria
Figures 1(i)-1(ii) show how the equilibrium payo functions behave in the selected sce-
narios, with the dashed lines showing the smooth-pasting of the three components of the
payo in (1.22) and (1.23). From Figure 1(i) to Figure 1(ii) we can see how a reduction
in the volatility seems to shrink the continuation region, hence, the players become more
cautious, reducing their intervention regions when there is more uncertainty. Another
interesting fact to note is how the relative distance between x̄1 and x̄2 becomes smaller.
This can be due to the increase in P2's terminal payo sensitivity, b, and the increase in
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P1's exogenous cost, s. In one direction, P2 is losing more money when she decides to
terminate the game, therefore she will not stop when the state process value is too high,
hence she reduces her threshold x̄2. In the other, since P1 is facing higher exogenous
costs, she pushes the target, x∗1, as far as she can, making sure the state process is not
going too low, rising the barrier x̄1.
Figures 1(iii)-1(iv)-1(v)-1(vi) represent some comparative statics of the thresholds
x̄1, x
∗
1 and x̄2 for Scenario B. Similar graphs hold for Scenario A as well, therefore they are
omitted. First, in Figure 1(iii) we can observe how an increase in P1's xed cost expands
the gap between x̄1 and x
∗
1. The more P1 has to pay at any intervention time, the less
often she will intervene, lowering the threshold, x̄1, and increasing the target, x
∗
1. This
allows P2, who does not like high values of x, to slightly lower her threshold, x̄2, so as to
pay less when she will stop the game. In Figure 1(iv) the behaviour with respect to the
proportional cost is quite dierent. P1 will reduce the interventions for higher λ, with
the distance between x̄1 and x
∗
1 left nearly unchanged, while P2 keeps the barrier at a
constant level x̄2. In particular, P1 tends to never intervening when the proportional cost
reaches its maximum, set by the condition 1 − λr > 0. This behaviour shows how P1 is
quite indierent to changes in the proportional cost when this is not too big while she is
really sensitive once it gets high. Finally, in Figures 1(v)-1(vi) we can see that, when P2's
gains more each time P1 intervenes increases, P2 is happy playing for longer, heightening
the threshold x̄2, since she is receiving more money.
Equilibrium 2: P1 induces P2 to stop. To satisfy (1.44)-(1.45), we want ŵ to be
neither too high nor too low, in particular, high λ should help in (1.44) as high ŵ in
(1.45). As before, via graphical analysis it is possible to show that ŵ, solution to (1.43),
is decreasing in a, b, s and increasing in c, d, q, λ and γ. Therefore, the rst instance of
Nash equilibrium, Scenario B, has been selected to have high λ and ŵ, choosing high
values of c, d, q and γ and low values of b and s, whereas for Scenario A we have looked for
lower values of λ and adapted the others. The table below shows the selected parameter
settings, with x̄1 and x̄2 are as in Proposition 1.3.2:
r σ c d λ γ a b s q x̄1 x̄2
Scenario A 0.01 5 100 100 25 10 24 9 45 0 22.56 32.68
Scenario B 0.01 1.5 150 125 80 25 70 15 10 15 14.27 25.72.
As before, Figure 2(i)-2(ii) represent the equilibrium payo functions in the selected ex-
amples. First, we can observe that the continuation region in Scenario A is shifted to the
right with respect to the one in Scenario B and we can observe that its width has not
changed much from one case to the other. Furthermore, we can notice that Scenario B is
more protable for P2 and less protable for P1. These two facts might be explained by
the following changes from Scenario B to Scenario A: P1's exogenous cost, s, increases, so
P1 cannot tolerate low levels of x, increasing her threshold x̄1. Moreover, although P2's
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(i) x 7→V1(x) in red, x 7→V2(x) in blue for Sce-
nario A
(ii) x 7→ V1(x) in red, x 7→ V2(x) in blue for
Scenario B
(iii) c 7→ x̄1, x̄2 for Scenario B (iv) λ 7→ x̄1, x̄2 for Scenario B
(v) d 7→ x̄1, x̄2 for Scenario B (vi) γ 7→ x̄1, x̄2 for Scenario B
Figure 2: Type II Equilibria
gains, q, d and γ, decrease we do not see her threshold scale down as it would be expected
as the game is now less protable. This is probably due to b's reduction, which leads P2
to stop for higher values of x̄2 since she is going to lose less when she decides to stop.
Now, let us spend some words on the comparative statics in Figures 2(iii)-2(iv)-2(v)-
2(vi). When P1's costs, c and λ, increases, Figure 2(iii)-2(iv), P1 would intervene for
lower values of x and the distance x̄2 − x̄1 will increase, even though x̄2 gets lower as
well. This can be explained as follows, with the costs increasing, P1 is less willing to
intervene, reducing x̄1, even though this shift allows P2 to lower her threshold, x̄2, since
she likes low values of x. When the xed gain, d, rises, Figure 2(v), P2 can aord the
game to run for longer, increasing x̄2, as she will gain more when P1 will make her stop.
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Moreover, this makes P1 heighten x̄1 in order to limit the proportional costs increment.
Lastly, we have a similar behaviour to the one described above for the proportional gain,
γ, Figure 2(vi). The main dierence is the speed with which the distance between the
thresholds increases, higher for proportional gain increments. This happens because, in
case of proportional gain increments, P2 is more incentivised to push x̄2 far away since
the bigger the impulse the more the revenue, whereas an analogous behaviour in case of
xed gain increments would lead to a loss in the terminal payo outrunning the additional
prot due to the fact that the gain, d, does not depend on the intensity of the impulse
P1 is playing while the losses are increasing, since they depend on P2's threshold, −bx̄2.
Comparison between the two equilibria We conclude with a short discussion on
the reasons why P1 would play aggressively, forcing P2 to stop. To do so we compare rst
the two scenarios A and B in both equilibria. So, going from Type I to Type II we see
a reduction in the proportional gain, γ, an increase in P1 terminal payo sensitivity, b,
and a reduction in P2's exogenous gain, q, making P2 lower her threshold, x̄2, to reduce
the losses at the end of the game. Then, P1's exogenous cost, s, increases making P1
rise both the threshold and the target, x̄1 and x
∗
1 respectively. Furthermore, P1 terminal
payo sensitivity, a, increases and, intuitively incentivise P1 to let P2 end the game sooner
so to receive the terminal payo. More specically, since w̃ is decreasing in a, its increase
makes ln w̃ = θ(x̄2 − x̄1) decrease, hence, since the distance between the two thresholds
is now smaller, P1's target, x∗1, is closer to P2's barrier up to the point they coincide,
x∗1 ≡ x̄2.
Regarding Scenario B, again from Type I to Type II, we observe increments in the
terminal payo sensitivity of the two players, a and b, in particular P1's sensitivity rises
much more than in the rst scenario, hence, P1 is more incentivised to let P2 end the
game. Another important change regards the proportional cost, λ, which is very high in
case P1 induces P2 to stop. As we have seen before in the comparative statics in Figure
1(iv), P1 intervenes less and less when the proportional cost becomes higher and higher,
so it is more convenient to intervene only once, inducing P2 to stop.
We nally observe that while we have managed to nd numerical values for which only
one of the two types of Nash equilibria emerges at a time, the problem of whether the
two equilibria can coexist remains open.
1.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have introduced a general class of impulse controller vs stopper games
whose state variable evolves according to a multi-dimensional Brownian motion driven
diusion. Moreover, we have provided a verication theorem giving sucient conditions
under which the solution of the suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities we im-
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plemented coincides with the two players' equilibrium payo functions of the game. To
show how the verication theorem and the system of quasi-variational inequalities are
meant to be used, we have solved the game in a specic setting with linear payos and
a one-dimensional scaled Brownian motion as a state variable, discovering the existence
of two dierent types of equilibria which we have fully characterised. In particular, the
one where player 1 forces player 2 to end the game could be considered as a limit case
of the other equilibrium and further research in this direction might be interesting given
that we did not prove if the two equilibria are alternative and we were not able to nd
any setting under which they could coexist.
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1.A Appendix of Chapter 1
In this appendix, we have gathered some technical results used in the verication parts
of Section 1.3 for both types of Nash equilibrium. We start with two lemmas on the
continuation regions in the equilibrium where simultaneous actions are not allowed.
Lemma 1.A.1 Let W1 be as in (1.22). Then we have
δ(x) = (x∗1 − x)1(−∞, x∗1](x), x ∈ R.
Moreover
{MW1 −W1 < 0} = (x̄1, +∞) and {MW1 −W1 = 0} = (−∞, x̄1]. (1.47)
Proof 1.A.1 By a simple change of variable we obtain
MW1 = max
δ≥0
{W1(x+ δ)− c− λδ} = max
y≥x
{W1(y)− c− λ(y − x)}.
Let Γ(y) := W1(y)− λy. By denition of W1 we have Γ′(x̄1) = Γ′(x∗1) = 0. Moreover, the
following properties are satised:
(i) Γ′(x) = 0 in (−∞, x̄1];
(ii) Γ′(x) = a− λ < 0 in [x̄2, ∞);
(iii) Γ′(x) > 0 (resp. < 0) in (x̄1, x
∗
1) (resp. in (x
∗
1, x̄2)).
Properties (i) and (ii) are easily checked. Regarding (iii), recall that
Γ′(x) = ϕ′1(x)− λ = θC11eθx − θC12e−θx +
1
r
− λ, x ∈ (x̄1, x̄2).
To study its sign, notice that Γ′′(x) = θ2C11e
θx + θ2C12e
−θx > 0 for all x ∈ (x̄1, x̃),





(x∗1+x̄1). Moreover, since x̃ < x∗1 we have
Γ′′(x∗1) < 0. Hence, it follows that Γ
′(x) > 0 in (x̄1, x
∗
1), while Γ
′(x) < 0 in (x∗1, x̄2).





Γ(x∗1) in (−∞, x∗1]
Γ(x) in(x∗1, +∞)
which gives
argmaxδ≥0{W1(x+ δ)− c− λδ} =
{
{x∗1 − x} in (−∞, x∗1]
{0} in (x∗1, +∞)
This implies the rst part of our statement, i.e. δ(x) = (x∗1−x)1(−∞,x∗1](x). Now, to show
(1.47), notice rst that
MW1(x) =
{
W1(x)− ζ(x) in (x̄1,∞)





ϕ1(x)− ϕ1(x∗1) + c+ λ(x∗1 − x) in (x̄1, x∗1]
c in (x∗1, +∞)
Now, we prove that ζ > 0. By C0-pasting in x̄1 we have ϕ1(x̄1) = ϕ(x
∗
1)− c− λ(x∗1− x̄1),
therefore
ζ(x) = ϕ1(x)− ϕ1(x̄1)− λ(x̄1 − x) = Γ(x)− Γ(x̄1), x ∈ (x̄1, x∗1],
which is strictly positive since Γ is increasing in (x̄1, x
∗
1]. Hence, ζ is strictly positive and
we have
{MW1 −W1 < 0} = (x̄1, +∞), {MW1 −W1 = 0} = (−∞, x̄1]. 
Lemma 1.A.2 Let W2 be as in (1.23). Assume there exists a solution (z̃, w̃) to (1.29)-
(1.32) such that 1 < z̃ < w̃ and
0 ≤ (1− br)(1− λr)(w̃
2 − z̃)
















(w̃ − 1)2 + 1− br
θ
(1 + 2w̃ ln w̃ − w̃2) > 0.
Then, we have
{x ∈ R : −bx−W2(x) < 0} = (−∞, x̄2),
{x ∈ R : −bx−W2(x) = 0} = [x̄2, +∞).
Proof 1.A.2 First, we recall that
W2(x) =

−bx in [x̄2, +∞)
ϕ2(x) in (x̄1, x̄2)








We want to prove that ϕ2(x) > −bx in (x̄1, x̄2) and HW2(x) > −bx in (−∞, x̄1]. For the




























+2 (q − (1− br)x) > 0.











































+ 2z (q − (1− br)x̄2) ,


















We show that our assumptions grant that the expression above is positive, which in turn







− q < 0, (1− br)x̄2 − q ≥ 0.
Then, using (1.31), the two inequalities above can be rewritten as
0 ≤ (1− br)(1− λr)(w̃
2 − z̃)




s− q < 1− br
θ
,
which is true by assumption.




1) + d+ γ(x
∗
1 − x) > −bx, x ∈ (−∞, x̄1]. (1.49)
From the C0-pasting condition in x̄1 we have that ϕ2(x̄1) = ϕ2(x
∗
1) + d + γ(x
∗
1 − x̄1),
therefore we can rewrite (1.49) as
ϕ2(x̄1) + γ(x̄1 − x) > −bx.
Since b < γ we only need to check that F (x̄1) > 0:
F (x̄1) = ϕ2(x̄1) + bx̄1 = C21e
θx̄1 + C22e
−θx̄1 +























+ 2(q − (1− br)x̄1).
Now, using again the change of variable w = eθ(x̄2−x̄1), we have x̄1 = x̄2 − lnwθ and so
F (x̄1)e
θ(x̄2−x̄1) can be re-expressed as
((1− br)x̄2 − q)(w̃ − 1)2 +
1− br
θ
(1 + 2w̃ ln w̃ − w̃2),










(w̃ − 1)2 + 1− br
θ
(1 + 2w̃ ln w̃ − w̃2),
which is positive by assumption. 
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We conclude the appendix with two more lemmas on similar results for the other kind
of equilibrium, where P1 forces P2 to stop the game.
Lemma 1.A.3 Let W1 be as in (1.22). Assume there exists a solution ŵ to (1.43) such
that
(1− λr)(w − w lnw − 1) + crθw > 0.
Then we have
δ(x) = (x̄2 − x)1(−∞, x̄2](x), x ∈ R.
Moreover, we have
{MW1 −W1 < 0} = (x̄1, +∞), {MW1 −W1 = 0} = (−∞, x̄1].
Proof 1.A.3 First, observe that
MW1 = max
δ≥0
{W1(x+ δ)− c− λδ} = max
y≥x
{W1(y)− c− λ(y − x)}.
Let us denote Γ(y) := W1(y) − λy. By denition of W1 we have Γ′(x̄1) = 0. Moreover,
the following properties hold true:
(i) Γ′(x) = 0 in (−∞, x̄1];
(ii) Γ′(x) = a− λ < 0 in [x̄2, +∞);
(iii) Γ′(x) > 0 in (x̄1, x̄2).
As properties (i) and (ii) can be easily checked, we turn to showing (iii). Observe that,




































Using the fact that x̄1 = x̄2 − ln ŵθ and setting z = e




ln ŵ − cr + s
)
(z2 − 1)− 1− λr
θ
(z − 1)2 > 0,






(ln ŵ + 1)− (1− ar)x̄2 − cr + s
1−λr
θ
(ln ŵ − 1)− (1− ar)x̄2 − cr + s
)
> 0,
which is true whenever 1−λr
θ
(ln ŵ − 1) − (1 − ar)x̄2 − cr + s > 0. Therefore, recalling
(1.41), after some algebraic manipulation, we obtain the equivalent condition
(1− λr)(ŵ − ŵ ln ŵ − 1) + crθŵ > 0.
Hence property (iii) is fullled. As a consequence, Γ has a unique global maximum point
in x̄2, and the rest of the proof follows the same lines as for Lemma 1.A.1. Hence, the
details are omitted. 
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Lemma 1.A.4 Let W2 be as in (1.23). For every x ∈ R, assume there exists a solution ŵ
to (1.43) such that:
0 ≤ (1− br)(ŵ2 − 1) + 2(θrd− (1− γr) ln ŵ)ŵ < (1− br)(ŵ − 1)2.
Then, we have
{x ∈ R : W2(x) > −bx} = (−∞, x̄2), {x ∈ R : W2(x) = −bx} = [x̄2, +∞).
Proof 1.A.4 First, recall that
W2(x) =

−bx in [x̄2, +∞)
ϕ2(x) in (x̄1, x̄2)








Hence, we want to prove that ϕ2(x) > −bx in (x̄1, x̄2) and HW2(x) > −bx in (−∞, x̄1].
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+ 2z (q − (1− br)x̄2) ,


















We show that our assumptions grant that the expression above is positive. We proceed







− q < 0, (1− br)x̄2 − q ≥ 0,
which, using (1.42), can be rewritten as
0 ≤ (1− br)(ŵ2 − 1) + 2(θrd− (1− γr) ln ŵ)ŵ < (1− br)(ŵ − 1)2,
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which is true by assumption.
For the second inequality we have
−bx̄2 + d+ γ(x̄2 − x) > −bx, x ∈ (−∞, x̄1].
Since γ > b, the inequality holds whenever (γ − b)(x̄2 − x̄1) + d > 0, which is always true
since x̄2 > x̄1 by the ordering condition. 
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Chapter 2
Zero-sum Stochastic Dierential Games
with Impulse Controls: a Stochastic
Perron's Method Approach
2.1 Introduction
Dierential games have been widely studied since Isaacs' work [50] in 1965. In particular,
we are interested in the branch of continuous time games with impulse controls, where
players can act on the system only at discrete times, introduced by Bensoussan and Li-
ons [21] in 1974. In the deterministic case, Yong [78] studied a zero-sum game involving
impulse, continuous and switching controls proving the existence of the value of the game
by mean of viscosity solutions and Farouq et al [41] later allowed for more general jumps,
motivated by an application in mathematical nance. The rst result combining the the-
ory of viscosity solutions with stochastic dierential games in which both players adopt
impulse controls is by Cosso [38] in 2013, where he showed via the Dynamic Program-
ming Principle that nite time zero-sum games admit a value. Thereafter, Mazid [63] and
Zhang L. [80] generalised his work, weakening his assumption the rst, and using a BSDE
approach the second. Basu and Stettner [10] studied the zero-sum game when the state
dynamics is a weak Feller-Markov process introducing the concept of shifted strategies,
which allows them to restrict the game to a sequence of Dynkin games, to provide exis-
tence and uniqueness of a saddle point. Further research has been done in the zero-sum
case when only one agent plays impulse controls while the other is playing classic contin-
uous controls, see Azimzadeh [6] and Zhang F. [79]. It is important to point out that all
these works, as most of the literature on stochastic dierential games, rely on the Elliot
and Kalton [42] formulation, according to which the upper and lower value functions are
dened as the payo when one player plays an open-loop control while the other is playing
a best response strategy. This formulation is clearly asymmetric as it produces two value
functions whose comparison is debatable. We believe a symmetric formulation where the
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upper and the lower value functions compare by denition is more natural and we refer
to Sîrbu [74] for a thorough discussion. To achieve this goal, we model the strategical
interaction between players using feedback strategies following the works of [48, 74]. In
this way, players see how the other is acting, as they observe the path of the state up to
the current time, and are able to respond accordingly, without the need for asymmetric
formulations. Moreover, the viscosity solution approach with strategies à la Elliot and
Kalton, which was rst studied by Fleming and Souganidis [44] in their pioneering work
in 1989, is in general quite complicated and the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP)
cannot be proven working directly with the value functions. Instead here, once we have
proven that the stochastic Perron's Method can be adapted to dierential games with
impulse controls, we obtain the DPP as a by-product. The stochastic Perron's method
was rst introduced by Bayraktar and Sirbu [15] to construct viscosity solutions of linear
parabolic equations associated with stochastic dierential equations in a highly tractable
way, and later applied to Dynkin games [16] and stochastic dierential games [74].
Impulse strategies are well suited for all kind of situations in which xed and propor-
tional costs apply any time players control the state process. Indeed, the treatment with
singular or classic controls would be faulty since the rst would only capture proportional
costs, whereas the second would miss discrete interventions. Furthermore, both would not
be feasible since they would result in innite costs due to players moving innitely many
times the state process, as they are controlling it continuously, paying each time some
strictly positive xed cost. In such cases, the controller would rather choose a sequence of
intervention times at which he will induce a jump in the state dynamics. Such sequence
of intervention times and jump sizes is called impulse control, as those jump sizes are
commonly called impulses. This kind of controls have many applications, from nance to
energy markets to real options [8, 35, 43, 60] and in particular, they have experienced a
comeback in the latest years due to the research for more realistic nancial models, from
option pricing [22, 40, 75], to optimal portfolio selection [61, 68, 70], to options for long
term insurance contracts [36], to control of exchange rates [24, 29] and nally, to order
execution [27, 37]. Given the high interest, Aïd et al. [1] provided a general model for
nonzero-sum stochastic dierential games with impulse controls which was later gener-
alised to the mean-eld case by Basei et al [9].
This chapter is about nite time horizon zero-sum stochastic dierential games with
impulse controls and how to nd their Nash equilibrium conveniently. More precisely,
we study games in which the two players can act only at discrete times inducing jumps
in a continuous time stochastic process which will be denoted by X, whose controlled
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r ), t ≥ s.
This game is zero-sum, which means that the net change in wealth is zero and one player's
gain is equal to the other's loss; in the following we will refer to Player 1 (P1) as the
maximiser and to Player 2 (P2) as the minimiser. Any time one of the two players applies
an impulse to the system they face a cost, and, being the game zero-sum, it means they
are paying a penalty to the other whenever they like to intervene. Then, the two players
are going to respectively maximise and minimise the objective function which features a
running and a terminal payo together with the aforementioned interventions costs:















In particular, we dene the upper value of the game as the function associated with the
players' optimisation problem when P1 has priority of intervention over P2, meaning that,
if both want to apply an impulse at the same time, only P1's will work. Symmetrically,
we dene the lower value of the game when P2 has priority over P1. The upper and
lower value of the game are related to two dierent double-obstacle quasi-variational in-
equalities, resulting from the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) Partial Dierential
Equation (PDE), which we will solve via viscosity solutions using the stochastic Perron's
method.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2 we will formally describe the game, in
particular the denition of strategies according to which players intervene at stopping rules
instead of stopping times, and apply the related impulses based solely on the information
available up to then. Section 3 will adapt the stochastic Perron's method to such game and
provides, in particular, the appropriate denitions of stochastic sub and super-solutions
to construct the viscosity solution of the HJBI. Finally, in Section 4 we will prove a
comparison result, so that the value function constructed via Perron's method exists and
is unique.
2.2 Game Setting
Here we specify the framework of our zero-sum stochastic dierential game with impulse
controls, where two players can aect via impulses some given state variable evolving
according to a possibly time inhomogeneous SDE as follows.
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Uncontrolled state dynamics. Fix a nite time horizon T > 0 and some initial time
s ∈ [0, T ], we are given a xed probability space (Ω,F ,P) supporting some k-dimensional
Brownian motion W . Let Fs = (F st )t∈[s,T ] be the augmented ltration generated by W 's
increments starting at s and assume that the state process X takes values in Rd and
satises
dXt = b(t,Xt)dt+ σ(t,Xt)dWt, Xs = x, (2.1)
for some initial value x ∈ Rd, where the coecients b : [0, T ] × Rd → Rd and σ :
[0, T ]×Rd → Rd×k are assumed to be jointly continuous and locally Lipschitz continuous
in x, uniformly in time, i.e. for all K > 0, there exists a constant LK > 0 such that
|b(t, x1)− b(t, x2)|+ |σ(t, x1)− σ(t, x2)| ≤ LK |x1 − x2|, (2.2)
whenever |x1|, |x2| ≤ K and for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, we assume they have at most
linear growth in x, uniformly in time, i.e. there exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all
x ∈ Rd and t ∈ [0, T ], we have
|b(t, x)|+ |σ(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|),
so that existence of a unique strong solution is granted and X is well-dened. Note that
under the assumptions above X is well-dened even if the game starts at some stopping
time greater than s.
Players' strategies and controlled dynamics. The goal of both players is to max-
imise their payos via the application of optimal impulses at some strategically chosen
times. Before dening players' strategies we need to introduce, for a xed starting time s,
the Skorohod space D([s, T ]) := D([s, T ],Rd) and endow this path space with the ltration
Bs := (Bst )t∈[s,T ] dened by Bst := B(D([s, t])), t ∈ [s, T ],
where Bst := B(D([s, t])) is the Borel σ-algebra generated by the open sets in D([s, T ]).
Elements of D([s, T ]) will be denoted by y(·) or y where there is no ambiguity. Stopping
times on D([s, t]) with respect to Bs are called stopping rules, as in Karatzas and Sudderth
[55], i.e. a stopping rule is any mapping τ : D([s, T ])→ [s, T ] ∪ {+∞} such that
{y ∈ D([s, T ]) : τ(y) ≤ t} ∈ Bst , t ∈ [s, T ].
Moreover, we denote by Tρ the space of stopping rules greater than ρ, where ρ is itself a
stopping rule. The last ingredient needed for the denition of players' strategies are the
sets of values for the impulses.
Assumption 2.2.1 Let ∆ and Γ be two given compact subsets of the state space Rd.
We dene the players' strategies as follows:
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Definition 2.2.1 (Players' strategies) Let s ∈ [0, T ] and let ρ ∈ Ts be a given
stopping rule. Then, a strategy for Player 1 (henceforth, P1) starting at ρ is any sequence
u = (τn, δn)n≥1, where
 (τn)n≥1 ⊂ Tρ is a strictly increasing sequence of stopping rules, i.e. ρ ≤ τ1 < τ2 <
· · · , such that limn→+∞ τn = +∞ a.s.;
 (δn)n≥1 is a sequence of maps δn : D([s, T ]) → ∆ such that δn ∈ L0(Bτn) for all
n ≥ 1.
Analogously, a strategy for Player 2 (P2) starting at ρ, is any sequence v = (ηn, γn)n≥1,
where
 (ηn)n≥1 ⊂ Tρ is a strictly increasing sequence of stopping rules, i.e. ρ ≤ η1 < η2 <
· · · , such that limn→+∞ ηn = +∞ a.s.;
 (γn)n≥1 is a sequence of maps γn : D([s, T ])→ Γ with γn ∈ L0(Bηn) for all n ≥ 1.
The set of all P1 (resp. P2) strategies starting at ρ ∈ Ts, is denoted U sρ (resp. V sρ ).
Remarks 2.2.1 The denition of strategies starting at some possibly later time will be
very convenient in dening suitable notions of stochastic sub/super-solutions in order to
extend the stochastic Perron's method to zero-sum impulse games. Moreover, note that
when ρ = s we have the usual notion of strategies starting at the initial time.
We do not allow for simultaneous impulses, hence, when P1 and P2 are playing some
strategy u and v respectively, the controlled state variable evolves with either of the







































with t ∈ [s, T ]. The process Xs,x;u,v,− represents the state dynamics in case P2 has priority
of intervention over P1, whereas Xs,x;u,v,+ is otherwise. For ease of notation, we will refer
to δn(X
s,x;u,v,±) and γn(X
s,x;u,v,±) as δn and γn only.
The following lemma is needed for (Xs,x;u,v,±t )t∈[s,T ] to be well-dened. First, notice
that the controlled process evolves as the uncontrolled one in between impulses and that
these occur according to players' stopping rules. Furthermore, we know that the uncon-
trolled process is well dened for any stopping time greater than s, hence, we need a result
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that links B-stopping rules to F -stopping times to apply recursively the existence and
uniqueness result for the uncontrolled dynamics and obtain that (Xs,x;u,v,±t )t∈[s,T ] is also
well-dened.
Lemma 2.2.1 Let s ∈ [0, T ] and let τ be a stopping rule in Ts. Let (Xt)t∈[s,T ] be a
process with càdlàg paths, which is progressively measurable with respect to Fs. Then,
the random time τX : Ω→ [s, T ]∪{+∞} dened by τX(ω) := τ(X(ω)) is a stopping time
with respect to Fs. In addition XτX1τX<∞ is F sτX -measurable.
Proof 2.2.1 By assumption, X is a process with càdlàg paths, i.e. X(ω) ∈ D([s, T ]) for
all ω. Since τ is a stopping rule, we have
{y ∈ D([s, T ]) : τ(y) ≤ t} ∈ Bst , t ∈ [s, T ].
Then, taking the inverse image through X of the set above we obtain
X−1 ({y ∈ D([s, T ]) : τ(y) ≤ t}) = {(r, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω : r = τ(X(ω)) ≤ t} ∈ F st
since, by denition of progressively measurable process, we have that for all t ∈ [s, T ] the
mapping (r, ω) 7→ Xr(ω) is measurable on [s, t] × Ω equipped with the product σ-eld
B([s, T ])⊗F st . 
Players' payos. As we mentioned above, both players play impulses in order to max-
imise their payos, but since the game is zero-sum we have that P1 (the maximiser) is
going to receive a certain payo from P2 (the minimiser) depending on the strategies they
will be playing during the game. Such payos can be dened as follows:




































for any initial condition (s, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd and any pair of strategies (u, v) ∈ U ss ×
V ss . Again, J
−(s, x;u, v) represents the payo in case P2 has priority over P1, whereas
J+(s, x;u, v) is otherwise. The following assumptions on gains and costs grant in partic-
ular that the payo functionals J± are bounded:
Assumption 2.2.2 (i) The running gain f : [0, T ] × Rd → R and the nal gain g :
Rd → R are continuous and bounded.
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(ii) The costs φ : Rd × ∆ → R+ and ψ : Rd × Γ → R+ are continuous and bounded
away from zero, i.e. inf(t,δ)∈[0,T ]×∆ φ(t, δ) > 0 and inf(t,γ)∈[0,T ]×Γ ψ(t, γ) > 0.
Remarks 2.2.2 The assumptions above are admittedly not the most general. However,
they are consistent with the related literature on impulse games with viscosity solutions
and the stochastic Perron's method. Indeed, regarding the rst, our assumptions are
similar to Cosso's [38], our only restriction concerns the spaces of impulses, ∆ and Γ,
which are assumed compact rather then just closed subsets of Rd. Regarding the literature
on stochastic Perron method, in most of it no running cost/gain is considered, while the
terminal payo is taken continuous and bounded [15, 16, 74].
Our goal is to prove that the game has a value under both instances of priority and to
provide some sucient conditions to show when the type of priority has no eect, namely
the game has the same value regardless the priority rule. Now we can dene the upper
and lower value of the game as









We would heuristically expect V − ≤ V + since P2 is the minimiser and we will say that
the priority of intervention is not relevant if the two values are equal, i.e. V − = V + =: V .
HJBI equations and the concatenation property. At this point it is convenient to
dene the players' respective intervention operators, which will appear in the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) equations, as
MV (t, x) = sup
δ∈∆
[V (t, x+ δ)− φ(x, δ)] , HV (t, x) = inf
γ∈Γ
[V (t, x+ γ) + ψ(x, γ)] ,
for any bounded measurable function V : [0, T ]× Rd → R. These two operators describe
the value of the game right after P1's and P2's optimal interventions respectively. In
the next proposition we show that semi-continuity is preserved by the action of both
operators.
Proposition 2.2.1 If V : [0, T ] × Rd → R is a upper (lower) semi-continuous function
thenMV,HV : [0, T ]× Rd → R are upper (lower) semi-continuous as well.
Proof 2.2.2 Lower semi-continuity of HV . Let us take a sequence (tn, xn)n≥1 ∈ [s, T ]×
Rd and (t, x) ∈ [s, T ] × Rd so that (tn, xn) converges to (t, x). Since Γ is compact, for
each n ≥ 1 there exists a γn ∈ Γ such that HV (tn, xn) = V (tn, xn + γn) + ψ(xn, γn).
Moreover, the sequence of (γn)n≥1 is bounded, so by taking a subsequence if necessary




HV (tn, xn) = lim inf
n→∞
(V (tn, xn+γn)+ψ(xn, γn)) ≥ V (t, x+γ)+ψ(x, γ) ≥ HV (t, x)
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where the rst inequality is due to V being lower semi-continuous.
Upper semi-continuity of HV . As before we take a sequence (tn, xn)n≥1 converging to some
(t, x) in [s, T ] × Rd and x a γ = γ(t, x) ∈ Γ such that HV (t, x) = V (t, x + γ) + ψ(x, γ)
and HV (tn, xn) ≤ V (tn, xn + γ) + ψ(xn, γ) for all n ≥ 1. Hence,
lim sup
n→∞
HV (tn, xn) ≤ lim sup
n→∞
(V (tn, xn + γ) + ψ(xn, γ)) ≤ V (t, x+ γ) + ψ(x, γ),
which proves that HV is upper semi-continuous.
The semi-continuity properties ofMV can be proved in the same way, hence the details
are omitted. 
The upper value function, V +, will naturally be associated with the following double
obstacle problem, which we will refer to as Upper Isaacs (UI):{
min {max {−AV − Vt − f, V −HV } , V −MV } = 0, on [0, T )× Rd,
V (T, x) = g(x), x ∈ Rd,
(2.3)
with AV = b·∇V + 1
2
tr(σσ>D2V ) whereas the lower value function, V −, will be associated
with the following, which we will refer to as Lower Isaacs (LI):{
max {min {−AV − Vt − f, V −MV } , V −HV } = 0, on [0, T )× Rd,
V (T, x) = g(x), x ∈ Rd.
(2.4)
We say that the Isaacs condition holds whenever we have
max {min {−AV − Vt − f, V −MV } , V −HV }
= min {max {−AV − Vt − f, V −HV } , V −MV } (2.5)
on [0, T )× Rd.
Remarks 2.2.3 The Isaacs condition implies that the two values are the same, which
means that it does not really matter who has priority over the other as, in equilibrium,
it does not allow the players to achieve a better payo.
Earlier we have dened the strategies as starting from a stopping rule ρ ∈ Ts, although
the game is starting at some time s ≤ ρ. Therefore, in order to be able to use those
strategies we need a result that allows us to concatenate them to strategies starting from
an earlier time. Even though the result is stated for P1's strategies, an analogous one
clearly holds for P2's as well.
Proposition 2.2.2 (concatenation property) Let s ∈ [0, T ], ρ ∈ Ts and ũ =
(τ̃n, δ̃n) ∈ U sρ . Then, for each u = (τn, δn) ∈ U ss , the mapping u ⊗ρ ũ : D([s, T ]) →
([s, T ] ∪ {+∞})N ×∆N dened by*
u⊗ρ ũ := ((τ1, . . . , τn∗−1, τ̃1, τ̃2, . . .), (δ1, . . . , δn∗−1, δ̃1, δ̃2, . . .)), (2.6)
where n∗ := inf{n ≥ 1 : τn ≥ ρ}, is a strategy starting at s, i.e. u⊗ρ ũ ∈ U ss .
*To ease the notation, we omit the dependence on the path y(·).
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Proof 2.2.3 By construction, the strategy (τ̂n, δ̂n)n≥1 dened in (2.6) is composed of a
strictly increasing sequence of intervention times satisfying limn→+∞ τ̂n = +∞. Moreover,
by denition of u and ũ, it follows that δn ∈ L0(Bτn) whenever τn < τn∗ , and δ̃n ∈ L0(Bτ̃n)
for τ̃n ≥ τ̃1. Therefore, we deduce that u⊗ρ ũ ∈ U ss . 
2.3 Stochastic Perron's method
We want to nd the value of the game, under both priority rules, as viscosity solution
of the corresponding HJBI systems, (2.3)-(2.4), via the stochastic Perron's method. As
such, we are going to dene a suitable class of stochastic sub/super-solutions in a way
they satisfy their respective half dynamic programming principle (DPP). Once they are
dened properly, the stochastic Perron's method consists in showing that the inmum
of such stochastic super-solutions is a viscosity sub-solution of (2.3)-(2.4), whereas the
supremum of such sub-solutions is a viscosity super-solution of (2.3) or (2.4). Finally, to
show that the game has a value, namely that the inmum of stochastic super-solutions
is equal to the supremum of stochastic sub-solutions, we will have to perform only a
verication by comparison. This last step will be done in Section 2.4.
Denition of stochastic super/sub-solutions and their properties. In this part
we state the denitions of stochastic super/sub-solutions for UI and LI equations, together
with some preliminary elementary properties. We start with the notion of stochastic
super-solution of UI equation.
Definition 2.3.1 A function w : [0, T ]×Rd → R is called a stochastic super-solution of
the UI equation if:
1. it is bounded and continuous, it satises w(T, ·) ≥ g(·) and
(Hw − w)(t, x) ≥ 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd;
2. for each s ∈ [0, T ] and for each stopping rule ρ ∈ Ts, there exists a P2 strategy
ṽ = (η̃n, γ̃n) ∈ V sρ such that for any u = (τn, δn) ∈ U ss , v = (ηn, γn) ∈ V ss , x ∈ Rd



















where we have used the simplifying notation X := Xs,x;u,v⊗ρṽ,+, ρ := ρ(X), ζ :=
ζ(X), and similarly for δn and γ̃n.
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An immediate consequence of being a stochastic super-solution of the UI equation is
that, choosing ρ = s, there exists ṽ ∈ V ss such that, using the simplifying notation



















for all u ∈ U ss and ζ ∈ Ts. After taking the expectation, we can see that w satises the
half DPP, with the notation X := Xs,x;u,v,+:

















1{ηn 6=τl} + w (ζ,Xζ)
]
, (2.8)
for all ζ ∈ Ts. Moreover, since w(T, ·) ≥ g(·), we have w(s, x) ≥ V +(s, x) for all (s, x) ∈
[0, T ]× Rd. Indeed, if we take ζ = T we have

















1{ηn 6=τl} + w (T,XT )
]
≥ V +(s, x).
The stochastic sub-solutions of the LI equation are dened symmetrically as follows.
Definition 2.3.2 A function w : [0, T ] × Rd → R is called a stochastic sub-solution of
the LI equation if:
1. it is bounded and continuous, it satises w(T, ·) ≤ g(·) and
(Mw − w)(t, x) ≤ 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd;
2. for each s ∈ [0, T ] and for each stopping rule ρ ∈ Ts, there exists a strategy ũ =
(τ̃n, δ̃n) ∈ U sρ such that for any u = (τn, δn) ∈ U ss , v = (ηn, γn) ∈ V ss , x ∈ Rd and














ψ(Xηn−, γn) + w(ζ,Xζ) | F sρ
]
, (2.9)
where we have used the same simplifying notation as before with X := Xs,x;u⊗ρũ,v,−.
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By similar arguments as with the stochastic super-solution of the UI equation, we can
observe that a stochastic sub-solution of the LI equation satises w ≤ V − and the corre-
sponding half DPP. As stated in Sîrbu [74], the two denitions are symmetric and they
would be enough to proceed with the stochastic Perron's method in case the Isaacs con-
dition (2.5) holds. For the general case we will have to use stochastic super/sub-solution
of the LI/UI equations as well, which are dened as follows.
Definition 2.3.3 A function w : Rd → R is called a stochastic sub-solution of the UI
equation if:
1. it is bounded and continuous, it satises w(T, ·) ≤ g(·) and
(Mw − w)(t, x) ≤ 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd;
2. for each s ∈ [0, T ], for each stopping rule ρ ∈ Ts and for each v = (ηn, γn) ∈ V ss
there exists a strategy ũ = (τ̃n, δ̃n) ∈ U sρ such that for any u = (τn, δn) ∈ U ss , x ∈ Rd



















with X := Xs,x;u⊗ρũ,v,+.
Proceeding in the usual way, choosing ρ = s in the denition above and taking the
expectation we get the half DPP

















1{ηn 6=τl} + w(ζ,Xζ)
]
. (2.10)
Before proceeding any further, we need to introduce some more notation: we denote by
 U+/− the set of stochastic super/sub-solutions of the UI,
 L+/− the set of stochastic super/sub-solutions of the LI.
Remarks 2.3.1 The sets U+/− and L+/− are non empty. For instance, let's focus on U+.
Then, it contains all the functions of the form
w(ρ, x) = K + (T − ρ)C,
where K ≥ sup g and C ≥ sup f . Here we check that all the conditions are satised:
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 w(T, x) = K ≥ sup g ≥ g(x) for all x ∈ Rd;
 (w −Hw)(t, x) = −ψ(x, δ) ≤ 0 for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd;
 for each s ∈ [0, T ] and for each ρ ∈ Ts there exists P2's strategy ṽ, consisting of no
impulses from ρ onwards, such that for any u ∈ U ss and any v ∈ V ss , x ∈ Rd and
ζ : ρ ≤ ζ ≤ T we have







φ(Xτn−, δn) + w(ζ,Xζ) | F sρ
]
.
Note that the term
∑
n:ρ≤ηn<ζ
ψ(Xηn−, γn) is absent due to ṽ, since there are no im-
pulses sent by P2.




w ≤ V + ≤ inf
w∈U+




w ≤ V − ≤ inf
w∈L+
w := l+, (2.12)
so that l− ≤ V − ≤ V + ≤ u+. We want to prove that u+ (resp. u−) is a viscosity sub-
solution (resp. super-solution) of the UI so that, after a comparison result, we obtain
u− ≥ u+. As a consequence we nd the value of the game in which P1 has priority, u− =
V + = u+. The same reasoning can be applied to l−/+ in order to obtain l− = V − = l+.
Remarks 2.3.2 The function u+ is upper semi-continuous, being the pointwise inmum
of continuous functions (each function w ∈ U+ is indeed continuous, hence upper semi-
continuous), whereas u− is lower semi-continuous since it is dened as the pointwise
supremum of continuous functions. Analogous statements hold for l+ and l−.
In order to extend the stochastic Perron's method to our setting we need the following
auxiliary properties adapted from Sîrbu [74, Lemmas 3.7-8].
Lemma 2.3.1 (i) If w1, w2 ∈ U+, then w1 ∧ w2 ∈ U+. If w1, w2 ∈ U−, then w1 ∨ w2 ∈
U−.
(ii) There exists a non-increasing sequence wn ∈ U+ such that wn ↓ u+ and a non-
decreasing sequence w′n ∈ U− such that w′n ↑ u−.
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Proof 2.3.1 ( of Lemma 2.3.1) (i) First, we prove property 1 in Denition 2.3.1, i.e.
Hw − w ≥ 0 with w := w1 ∧ w2. Being Γ compact, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd there exists
some γ̂(t, x) such that
(Hw − w)(t, x) = w(t, x+ γ̂(t, x)) + ψ(x, γ̂(t, x))− w(t, x)
≥ (Hw1 − w)(t, x)1{w1(t,x+γ̂(t,x))≤w2(t,x+γ̂(t,x))}
+ (Hw2 − w)(t, x)1{w1(t,x+γ̂(t,x))>w2(t,x+γ̂(t,x))},
which is non-negative. Now we turn to property 2: let ρ ∈ Ts and consider two strategies
ṽ1 = (η̃1n, γ̃
1
n)n≥1, ṽ
2 = (η̃2n, γ̃
2
n)n≥1 belonging to V
s
ρ for P2 starting at time ρ and corre-
sponding to the denitions of the UI stochastic super-solutions w1, w2. After dening a
new strategy ṽ starting at ρ by combining the previous two as
ṽ(y) = ṽ1(y)1{w1(ρ(y),y(ρ(y)))≤w2(ρ(y),y(ρ(y)))} + ṽ
2(y)1{w1(ρ(y),y(ρ(y)))>w2(ρ(y),y(ρ(y)))},
one can check that ṽ ∈ V sρ satises the inequality (2.7) for w = w1 ∧ w2, so that w is a
stochastic super-solution of the UI. Similar arguments can be used to prove the second
property in (i).
(ii) Proposition 2.A.1 grants that there exists a sequence (w̃n)n≥1 ∈ U+ such that
u+ = infn≥1 w̃n. Now, we can just dene wn = w̃1 ∧ w̃2 ∧ . . . ∧ w̃n ↓ u+. A very similar
proof leads to the analogous property of u−. 
Lemma 2.3.2 Fix a compact K ⊂ [s, T ] × Rd and a non-increasing sequence (wn)n≥1
of stochastic super-solutions in U+ converging pointwise to u+. Then, such sequence




(wn − u+)(t, x) < ε.
Proof 2.3.2 Let ε > 0. For each n ≥ 1, let us dene the function gn(t, x) := (wn −
u+)(t, x) and the set An := {(t, x) ∈ K | gn(t, x) < ε}. Due to the fact that gn is non-
increasing we have that An ⊆ An+1. Moreover, since gn is lower semi-continuous, An
is open. Hence, due to gn(t, x) → 0, n → ∞, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd, (An)n≥1 is
an open cover of K. Then, by compactness of K there exists some n0 ≥ 1 such that
K ⊂ ∪n0n=1An = An0 , which means that sup(t,x)∈K(wn − u+)(t, x) < ε. 
Corollary 2.3.1 Fix a sequence of (wn)n≥0 as in the lemma above. Then, for each
(t0, x0) ∈ [s, T ] × Rd and r > 0 xed there exists an ε > 0 such that the sequence
(Hwn)n≥0 converges uniformly to Hu+ in Br(t0, x0), i.e. for every ε > 0 there exists
n0 ≥ 1 such that for all n ≥ n0
sup
(t,x)∈Br(t0,x0)
(Hwn −Hu+)(t, x) < ε.
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Proof 2.3.3 To begin, let us note that we have
sup
(t,x)∈Br(t0,x0)
(Hwn(t, x)−Hu+(t, x)) ≤ sup
(t,x)∈Br(t0,x0)
wn(t, x+ γ
∗(t, x))− u+(t, x+ γ∗(t, x))
≤ sup
(t,x)∈B(t0,r)×(Br(x0)+Γ)
(wn − u+)(t, x)
where γ∗(t, x) ∈ arg minγ∈Γ(u+(t, x+ γ) + ψ(x, γ)) and Br(x0) + Γ := {x+ γ : γ ∈ Γ, x ∈




(Hwn −Hu+)(t, x) < ε.

Viscosity solutions. Here we introduce the denition of viscosity solutions we are
going to use throughout the rest of the chapter.
Definition 2.3.4 An upper semi-continuous function u : [0, T ]× Rd → R is a viscosity
sub-solution of (2.3) if, for all (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd and ϕ ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × Rd) such that
ϕ− u has a local minimum at (t0, x0) and u(t0, x0) = ϕ(t0, x0), we have
max {min {−Aϕ− ϕt − f, u−Mu} , u−Hu} ≤ 0 in (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T )× Rd, (2.13)
max {min {u− g, u−Mu} , u−Hu} ≤ 0 on {T} × Rd. (2.14)
A lower semi-continuous function u : [0, T ]×Rd → R is a viscosity super-solution of (2.3)
if, for all (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd and ϕ ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × Rd) such that ϕ − u has a local
maximum at (t0, x0) and u(t0, x0) = ϕ(t0, x0), we have
max {min {−Aϕ− ϕt − f, u−Mu} , u−Hu} ≥ 0 in (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T )× Rd, (2.15)
max {min {u− g, u−Mu} , u−Hu} ≥ 0 on {T} × Rd. (2.16)
A function u is a viscosity solution if it is both a sub and a super-solution. The denitions
of viscosity super and sub-solutions of (2.4) are similar.
Main results of stochastic Perron's method. The following theorem is one of the
main results of the stochastic Perron's method applied to impulse games. It provides
a characterisation of the supremum (resp. inmum) of stochastic sub-solutions (resp.
super-solutions) of the UI (resp. LI) in terms of viscosity solutions of the corresponding
HJBI equations. We stress that one of the strengths of such an approach is that we obtain
the DPP as by-product of such a characterisation.
Theorem 2.3.1 Under Assumption 2.2.2 the following hold:
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1. The function l+ is a bounded upper semi-continuous viscosity sub-solution of the LI
equation and the function l− is a bounded lower semi-continuous viscosity super-
solution of the LI equation and they both satisfy the corresponding halves of the
DPP for the lower equation.
2. The function u+ is a bounded upper semi-continuous viscosity sub-solution of the
UI equation and satises the half DPP (2.8). The function u− is a bounded lower
semi-continuous viscosity super-solution of the UI equation and satises the half
DPP (2.10);
Proof 2.3.4 1. Viscosity sub-solution of the LI.
1.1. Interior sub-solution property for l+. We assume by contradiction that l+ = infw∈L+ w
is not a viscosity sub-solution of LI in the parabolic interior, i.e. for some r > 0,
(t0, x0) ∈ [0, T )× Rd and some test function ϕ ∈ C1,2([0, T )× Rd) such that
min
(t,x)∈Br(t0,x0)










> 0 at (t0, x0).
This is equivalent to one of the following two cases:
(i) both (−Aϕ− ϕt − f)(t0, x0) > 0 and (l+ −Ml+)(t0, x0) > 0;
(ii) (l+ −Hl+)(t0, x0) > 0.
Let us rst analyse case (ii). We know that, by Denition 2.3.1, w − Hw ≤ 0 for all
w ∈ L+. By Lemma 2.3.2 we can select a w ∈ L+ such that Hl+(t0, x0) + ε > Hw(t0, x0)
for an arbitrarily small ε > 0 so that we have
(w −Hl+)(t0, x0)− ε < (w −Hw)(t0, x0) ≤ 0.
In particular, since by denition l+ = infw∈L+ w, it follows that w ≥ l+ leading us to
(l+ −Hl+)(t0, x0)− ε ≤ (w −Hl+)(t0, x0)− ε < (w −Hw)(t0, x0) ≤ 0,
which shows that l+ −Hl+ > 0 is impossible.
Let us turn to case (i). Assume that we have both inequalities
(−Aϕ− ϕt − f)(t0, x0) > 0, (l+ −Ml+)(t0, x0) > 0. (2.18)
Fix ξ > 0, by continuity of the coecients of the SDE (2.1), we can nd a small enough
open ball Bε(t0, x0) for some ε > 0, such that
−Aϕ− ϕt − f > 0 on Bε(t0, x0),
ϕ− ξ ≥ l+ on Tε/2(t0, x0),
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where the second inequality comes from (2.17) and Tε/2(t0, x0) := Bε(t0, x0) \Bε/2(t0, x0).
Moreover, since ϕ is continuous andMl+ is upper semi-continuous (see Proposition 2.2.1),
for ε′ small enough, the second inequality in (2.18) implies
ϕ− ε′ ≥Ml+ on Bε(t0, x0).
Let ξ > ξ′ > ξ/2. By the property (ii) in Lemma 2.3.1, there exists a sequence wn ∈ L+
with wn ↓ l+ as n→∞. Using Lemma 2.A.1 and Lemma 2.3.2, we can nd n suciently
large such that ϕ ≥ wn + ξ′ on Tε/2(t0, x0) and wn − l+ < ξ′ on Bε(t0, x0). Note that the
two inequalities are compatible on the torus since ξ − ξ′ < ξ′, indeed l+ − wn + ξ′ > 0ϕ− wn − ξ′ ≥ 0 ⇒
ϕ− wn − (ξ − ξ′) > 0ϕ− wn − ξ′ ≥ 0
due to ϕ− l+ ≥ ξ. Since such index n will remain xed throughout the rest of the proof,
we can conveniently set w := wn. Then, we choose 0 < µ < ξ
′ ∧ ε′ so that the function
ϕµ := ϕ− µ satises the properties
−ϕµt −Aϕµ + f > 0 on Bε(t0, x0) (2.19)
ϕµ > w on Tε/2(t0, x0) (2.20)
ϕµ >Ml+ on Bε(t0, x0) (2.21)
and





ϕµ ∧ w on Bε(t0, x0)
w outside
given that wµ(t0, x0) < l
+(t0, x0) we obtain a contradiction if we can show w
µ ∈ L+.
Now, x s ∈ [0, T ], u = (τn, δn)n and let ρ ∈ Ts. We need to construct an impulse
strategy ṽ ∈ V sρ satisfying the properties as in the denition of the LI stochastic super-
solution for wµ (cf. Denition 2.3.1). We know already that w is a stochastic super-
solution of the LI equation and, as such, there exists an impulse strategy ṽ1 ∈ V sρ satisfying
(2.7) from ρ onwards. Then, we describe ṽ as follows:
1. If ϕµ < w at ρ, play the no impulse strategy, that we denote v̂ ≡ 0.
2. If ϕµ ≥ w at ρ, play ṽ1.
3. Play 1-2 until ρ1(y) ∧ τu1 (y) where ρ1(y) := inf{t ∈ [ρ(y), T ] : (t, y(t)) ∈ ∂Bε/2(t0, x0)}
(with the convention: inf ∅ = +∞) and τu1 (y) is the rst stopping rule accord-
ing to the strategy u = (τn, δn)n≥1 ∈ U sρ previously xed, such that (τ, y(τ)) ∈
Bε/2(t0, x0)
c. Here we know that wµ = w by construction (2.20), either by continu-
ity, if ρ1(y) ∧ τu1 (y) = ρ1(y), or by denition of τu1 otherwise.
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4. After ρ1(y) ∧ τu1 (y), play the strategy ṽ3 ∈ V sρ1∧τu1 such that the stochastic super-
solution w satises (2.7) from ρ1(y) ∧ τu1 (y).
The strategy doing 1-2 above, that we call ṽ2 ∈ V sρ , can be written formally as
ṽ2(y) = v̂(y)1{ϕµ(ρ(y),y(ρ(y)))<w(ρ(y),y(ρ(y)))} + ṽ1(y)1{ϕµ(ρ(y),y(ρ(y)))≥w(ρ(y),y(ρ(y)))}.
Now, to complete the denition of ṽ ∈ V sρ , it remains to concatenate ṽ2 ∈ V sρ with
ṽ3 ∈ V sρ1(y)∧τu1 (y) as follows
ṽ := ṽ2 ⊗ρ1∧τu1 ṽ3 ∈ V
s
ρ .
At this point we are ready to use ṽ to show that wµ satises (2.7).
Hence, let us x v ∈ V ss , x ∈ Rd and ζ ∈ Tρ. Denote by X := Xs,x;u,v⊗ρṽ,−, where ṽ
was just dened above, while ρ := ρ(X) and ζ := ζ(X). Let also set ρ1 := ρ1(X) and
τu1 := τ
u








t 1Ac on {ρ ≤ t ≤ ρ1 ∧ τu1 }.




c, which means we only need to show that (2.7) is satised on A since we
know it is satised on Ac by denition of stochastic super-solution (recall that w ∈ L+).




















1{ζ<τu1 ∧ρ1} | Fsρ

= (I) + (II),
where we set ∆ϕµ(s,Xs) := (ϕ
µ(s,Xs) − ϕµ(s−, Xs−)) = (ϕ(s,Xs) − ϕ(s−, Xs−)) =:
∆ϕ(s,Xs). We consider the two summands on the RHS above separately:
(I) ≥ E






1{τu1 ∧ρ1≤ζ} | Fsρ

≥ E












1{τu1 ∧ρ1≤ζ} | Fsρ

where the rst inequality follows from (2.19) and v̂ ≡ 0 (jumps occur only at times τn,
n ≥ 1), while the second one is due to the following two arguments. First, since there are
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no interventions coming from P2, the related costs vanish, i.e.
∑
ψ = 0. Second, recall
that w satises w − l+ < ξ′ by construction so that, due to (2.21) and the denition of
the stopping rule ρ1 ∧ τu1  we have
ϕµ(τn−, Xτn−) >Ml+(τn−, Xτn−) ≥ l+(τn, Xτn− + δn)− φ(Xτn−, δn)
> w(τn, Xτn− + δn)− φ(Xτn−, δn)− ξ′
> ϕµ(τn, Xτn− + δn)− φ(Xτn−, δn)− ξ′
and since ξ > ξ′ is arbitrary it follows
ϕµ(τn, Xτn− + δn)− ϕµ(τn, Xτn−) ≤ φ(Xτn−, δn).























As mentioned in step 4 of the construction of the impulse strategy ṽ ∈ V sρ , by denition
of stochastic super-solution, ṽ3 ∈ V sρ1∧τu1 provides (2.7) concatenated with any previous
strategy v and against any P1 strategy u so that, from ρ1 ∧ τu1 , we have
wµ(ρ1 ∧ τu1 , Xρ1∧τu1 ) = w(ρ1 ∧ τ
u





























ψ(Xη̃n−, γ̃n) + w
µ(ζ,Xζ) | F sρ1∧τu1
 .














ψ(Xη̃n−, γ̃n) + w
µ(ζ,Xζ) | F sρ
]
.
Note that the stopping rule ρ1 ∧ τu1 guarantees that ϕµ(t,Xt) < w(t,Xt) for all t ∈ [ρ, ρ1 ∧ τu1 ) on
A, which would not necessarily be true if we picked ρ1 alone instead, as in the works by Sîrbu [74] and
Bayraktar et al. [11]. This is due to the fact that in our case we do not necessarily get to the boundary
∂Bε/2(t0, x0) in a diusive manner due to the presence of the jumps induced by players' impulses.
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Finally, it is left to be shown that
(wµ −Hwµ)(t, x) ≤ 0 for all (t, x) ∈ [s, T ]× Rd.
First, we note that
(wµ −Hwµ)(t, x) ≤ (w −Hwµ)(t, x)
=
{
max{(w −Hw)(t, x), (w −Hϕµ)(t, x)} if (t, x+ γ∗(t, x)) ∈ Bε(t0, x0),
(w −Hw)(t, x) otherwise,
where γ∗ = γ∗(t, x) ∈ arg minγ∈Γ [wµ(t, x+ γ) + ψ(x, γ)]. Hence, we only need to show
w−Hϕµ ≤ 0 for (t, x+γ∗) ∈ Bε(t0, x0) since w−Hw ≤ 0 follows by denition of w ∈ L+.
Then, recall that, ϕ ≥ l+ and w < l+ + ξ′ hold on Bε(t0, x0). Therefore, by denition of
ϕµ := ϕ− µ and w we have
(w −Hϕµ)(t, x) = w(t, x)− ϕµ(t, x+ γ∗)− ψ(x, γ∗)
= w(t, x)− ϕ(t, x+ γ∗)− ψ(x, γ∗) + µ
≤ w(t, x)− l+(t, x+ γ∗)− ψ(x, γ∗) + µ
< w(t, x)− w(t, x+ γ∗)− ψ(x, γ∗) + µ+ ξ′
< (w −Hw)(t, x) + 2ξ′ ≤ 2ξ′
as Hw(t, x) ≤ w(t, x + γ∗) + ψ(x, γ∗) and µ < ξ′, to show that (w − Hϕµ)(t, x) ≤ 0 by
letting ξ′ tend to zero.
1.2. The terminal condition property for l+. We assume by contradiction that there exists
x0 ∈ Rd such that
max{min{l+ − g, l+ −Ml+}, l+ −Hl+} > 0 at (T, x0),
which is satised whenever we have one of the two cases:
(i) (l+ − g)(T, x0) > 0 and (l+ −Ml+)(T, x0) > 0;
(ii) (l+ −Hl+)(T, x0) > 0.
As shown in part 1.1, case (ii) is not possible. Therefore, let us consider case (i). Due to
continuity of g and upper semi-continuity ofMl+ there exists an ε > 0 such that
l+(T, x0) ≥ max{g,Ml+}(t, x) + ε for all (t, x) ∈ Bε(T, x0),
where, with a slight abuse of notation, we denote as Bε(T, x0) the restriction Bε(T, x0) ∩
([s, T ]×Rd). Since l+ is bounded by construction, it is bounded on the torus Tε/2(T, x0)








Then, for k > 0 dene the function
ϕν,ε,k(t, x) := l+(T, x0) +
(x− x0)2
ν
+ k(T − t)
and apply Lemma 2.A.1 and Lemma 2.3.2 to a sequence of stochastic super-solutions
(wn)n≥1 ∈ L+, as done previously in part 1.1, to nd n suciently large so that ϕν,ε,k ≥
wn + ξ
′ on Tε/2(T, x0) and wn − l+ < ξ′ on Bε(T, x0) for some ξ/2 < ξ′ < ξ. Therefore,







Moreover, for k > 0 large enough ϕν,ε,k satises
−ϕν,ε,kt −Aϕν,ε,k − f > 0 on Bε(T, x0)
and
ϕν,ε,k(t, x) ≥ l+(T, x0) ≥Ml+(t, x) on Bε(T, x0).
Hence, for 0 < µ < ξ ∧ ε we dene the function wµ,ν,ε,k as
wµ,ν,ε,k :=
{
w ∧ (ϕν,ε,k − µ) on Bε(T, x0)
w otherwise
to replicate the arguments in part 1.1 to show wµ,ν,ε,k ∈ L+ as
wµ,ν,ε,k(T, x) ≥ ϕν,ε,k(T, x)− µ ≥ l+(T, x0)− µ ≥ g(x) + ε− µ ≥ g(x)
for (T, x) ∈ Bε(T, x0) and reach a contradiction since
wµ,ν,ε,k(T, x0) = l
+(T, x0)− µ < l+(T, x0) = inf
w∈L+
w.
2. l− is a viscosity super-solution of LI.
2.1. The interior super-solution property for l−. Let (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T )×Rd in the parabolic




(ϕ− l−)(t, x) = (ϕ− l−)(t0, x0) = 0.









< 0 at (t0, x0)
which happens in one of the following two cases:
(i) both −ϕt −Aϕ− f < 0 and l− −Hl− < 0;
(ii) both l− −Ml− < 0 and l− −Hl− < 0.
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Let us rst analyse case (ii). Similarly to part 1.1, we know that w −Mw ≥ 0 for all
w ∈ L− by denition. By Lemma 2.3.2, we can select a w ∈ L− such thatMl−(t0, x0)−ε <
Mw(t0, x0) for an arbitrarily small ε > 0 so that we have
(w −Ml−)(t0, x0) + ε > (w −Mw)(t0, x0) ≥ 0.
In particular, since by denition of l− we have l− = supw∈L− w, it follows that w ≤ l−
leading us to
(l− −Ml−)(t0, x0) + ε ≥ (w −Ml−)(t0, x0) + ε > (w −Mw)(t0, x0) ≥ 0
to show that l− −Ml− < 0 is impossible.
Let us turn to case (i). Assume that we have both−ϕt −Aϕ− f < 0 and l− −Hl− < 0
at (t0, x0). As in part 1.1, x ξ > 0, by continuity we can nd a small ball Bε(t0, x0) for
some ε > 0 such that
−Aϕ− ϕt − f < 0 on Bε(t0, x0),
ϕ+ ξ ≤ l− on Tε/2(t0, x0).
Moreover, since ϕ is continuous and Hl− is lower semi-continuous, for ε′ small enough we
have
ϕ+ ε′ ≤ Hl− on Bε(t0, x0).
Let ξ > ξ′ > ξ/2. By the property (ii) in Lemma 2.3.1, there exists a sequence wn ∈ L−
with wn ↑ l− as n→∞. Using Lemma 2.A.1 and Lemma 2.3.2, we can nd n suciently
large such that ϕ ≤ wn− ξ′ on Tε/2(t0, x0) and wn− l− > −ξ′ on Bε(t0, x0) as in part 1.1.
Set w := wn and choose 0 < µ < ξ
′ ∧ ε′ so that the function ϕµ := ϕ + µ satises the
properties
−ϕµt −Aϕµ − f < 0 on Bε(t0, x0) (2.22)
ϕµ < w on Tε/2(t0, x0) (2.23)
ϕµ < Hl− on Bε(t0, x0) (2.24)
and
ϕµ(t0, x0) = l




ϕµ ∨ w on Bε(t0, x0)
w outside.
Since wµ(t0, x0) > l
−(t0, x0) we obtain a contradiction if we can show w
µ ∈ L−. Then, x s
and let ρ ∈ Ts. We need to construct an impulse strategy ũ ∈ U ss satisfying the properties
as in the denition of stochastic sub-solution of the LI for wµ. We know already that w is
a stochastic sub-solution of the LI equation and, as such, there exists an impulse strategy
ũ1 ∈ U sρ satisfying (2.9) from ρ onwards. Then we formulate ũ as follows
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1. if ϕµ > w at ρ, play the no impulse strategy ū ≡ 0;
2. if ϕµ ≤ w at ρ, follow the strategy ũ1;
3. Follow 1-2 until (ρ1∧ηv1)(y) where ρ1(y) := inf{t ∈ [ρ(y), T ] : (t, y(t)) ∈ ∂Bε/2(t0, x0)}
(with the convention inf ∅ = +∞) and ηv1(y) is the rst stopping rule according to
v = (ηn, γn)n ∈ V ss such that (η, y(η)) ∈ Bε/2(t0, x0)c. Here we know that wµ = w
by construction (2.23);
4. After (ρ1∧ηv1)(y), follow ũ3 ∈ U sρ1∧ηv1 such that the stochastic sub-solution w satises
(2.9) from (ρ1 ∧ ηv1)(y).
Let's write formally the strategy doing 1-2 above as ũ2 ∈ U sρ by
ũ2(y) = û(y)1{ϕµ(ρ(y),y(ρ(y)))>w(ρ(y),y(ρ(y)))} + ũ1(y)1{ϕµ(ρ(y),y(ρ(y)))≤w(ρ(y),y(ρ(y)))}.
Now, to complete the denition of ũ ∈ U sρ it is left to concatenate ũ2 ∈ U sρ with ũ3 ∈
U sρ1(y)∧ηv1 (y)
as follows
ũ := ũ2 ⊗ρ1 ũ3 ∈ U sρ .
At this point we are ready to use ũ to show that wµ satises (2.9).
Hence, let us x u = (τn, δn)n≥1 ∈ U ss , v = (ηn, γn)n≥1 ∈ V ss , x ∈ Rd and ζ ∈ Tρ.
Denote by X := Xs,x;u⊗ρũ,v,−, where ũ was just dened above, while ρ := ρ(X) and




1(X)(note ρ1 ∧ ηu1 ≥ ρ by denition) and







t 1Ac on {ρ ≤ t ≤ ρ1 ∧ ηv1}.




c, which means we only need to show that (2.9) is satised on A since we
know it is satised on Ac by denition of stochastic sub-solution, w ∈ L−. Hence, we





















= (I) + (II).
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We consider the two summands on the RHS above separately:
(I)≤E
























where the rst inequality follows from (2.22) and û ≡ 0 (jumps occur only at ηns),
while the second one is due to the following two arguments. First, since there are no
interventions coming from P1, the related costs vanish, i.e.
∑
φ = 0. Second, due to
(2.24), similarly to part 1.1 we have
ϕµ(ηn−, Xηn−) < Hl−(ηn−, Xηn−) ≤ l−(ηn, Xηn− + γn) + ψ(Xηn−, γn)
< w(ηn, Xηn− + γn) + ψ(Xηn−, γn) + ξ
′
< ϕµ(ηn, Xηn− + γn) + ψ(Xηn−, γn) + ξ
′
and since ξ > ξ′ is arbitrary it follows
ϕµ(ηn, Xηn− + γn)− ϕµ(ηn−, Xηn−) ≥ −ψ(Xηn−, γn).























As mentioned in step 4 of the construction of the strategy ũ ∈ U sρ , by denition
of stochastic super-solution, ũ3 ∈ U sρ1∧ηv1 provides (2.9) concatenated with any previous
strategy u and against any P2 strategy v so that, from ρ1 ∧ ηv1 , we have
wµ(ρ1 ∧ ηv1 , Xρ1∧ηv1 ) = w(ρ1 ∧ η
v





























ψ(Xηn−, γn) + w
µ(ζ,Xζ) | F sρ1∧ηv1
 .
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ψ(Xηn−, γn) + w
µ(ζ,Xζ) | F sρ
]
.
Finally, it is left to be shown that
(wµ −Mwµ)(t, x) ≥ 0 ∀ (t, x) ∈ [s, T ]× Rd,
which can be proven as in part 1.1.
2.2. The terminal condition property for l−. First we argue by contradiction, similar to
the analogous step in 1.2, and then we construct a strategy ũ = (τ̃n, δ̃n) as in 2.1 above
depending on the xed ρ. Then, alike part 2.1, we apply Itô's formula and conditioning
to nish the proof. 
2.4 Verication by comparison
The last step needed to prove that the game has a value is the verication by comparison,
so that the inmum of stochastic super-solutions of, respectively, the LI and UI (i.e.
l+/u+) is equal to the supremum of stochastic sub-solutions of the LI and UI (i.e. l−/u−).
The verication consists in proving that u− ≥ u+ which, by denition, implies u− = V + =
u+ (analogously we get l− = V − = l+). The auxiliary Lemma below is an adaptation
from the optimal control case, see Ishii [51] Lemma 3.3 and Seydel [73] Lemma 5.8.
Lemma 2.4.1 Let u : [0, T ]×Rd → R be an upper semi-continuous viscosity sub-solution
of (2.13)-(2.14). Let s ∈ [0, T ] and assume that there exist w ∈ C1,2([s, T ] × Rd) and a
positive function k : [s, T ]× Rd → R such that
(Aw + wt + f)(t, x) ≥ k(t, x) (t, x) ∈ [s, T )× Rd
max
{
(w−Hw)(t, x), w(t, x)− inf
δ∈∆
[w(t, x+ δ)−φ(x, δ)]
}
≤−k(t, x) (t, x) ∈ [s, T ]× Rd
w(T, x)− g(x) ≤ −k(T, x) x ∈ Rd.








is a viscosity sub-solution of




= 0 (t, x) ∈ [s, T )× Rd,




= 0 x ∈ Rd.
(2.25)
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Proof 2.4.1 For any ϕ ∈ C1,2([s, T ]×Rd) we suppose um − ϕ attains a local maximum
at (t0, x0) ∈ [s, T ]× Rd. Then, we have




























attains a local maximum at (t0, x0).














≤ 0 in (t0, x0).



















via multiplying by (1− 1/m) we get
−Aϕ− ϕt − f +
k
m
≤ −Aϕ− ϕt − f +
f +Aw + wt
m
≤ 0,
from which we obtain







































(u(t, x+ δ)− φ(x, δ))
+








(u−Mu) (t0, x0) +
w(t, x)− w(t, x+ δ∗) + φ(x, δ∗)
m





where δ∗ is such that supδ[u(t, x+ δ)− φ(x, δ)] = u(t, x+ δ∗)− φ(x, δ∗).
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(u(t, x+ γ) + ψ(x, γ))
+














Regarding the terminal condition, we know
min{u− g, u−Mu} ≤ 0, u−Hu ≤ 0.


















Before we proceed with the comparison theorem we provide the denition of viscosity
solution to the HJBI (2.3)-(2.4) by means of jets, as it is needed in the proof. By S(d)
we denote the set of symmetric matrices of dimension d.
Definition 2.4.1 (From Section 8 [39]) Let v : [0, T ] × Rd → R be a lower semi-
continuous function, then we denote by J2,−v(t, x) the parabolic sub-jet of v at (t, x) ∈
[0, T )× Rd as the set of triples (p, q,X) ∈ Rd+1 × S(d) such that
v(s, y) ≥ v(t, x) + p(s− t) + 〈q, (y − x)〉+ 1
2
〈X(y − x), y − x〉+ o(|s− t|+ |y − x|2),
as s → t (s → t+, when t = 0) and y → x. We also introduce the parabolic limiting
sub-jet of v at (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× Rd:
J̄2,−v(t, x) =
{
(p, q,X) ∈ Rd+1 × S(n) : ∃ (tn, xn, pn, qn, Xn) ∈ [0, T )× R2d+1 × S(n)
such that (pn, qn, Xn) ∈ J2,−v(tn, xn) and
(tn, xn, v(tn, xn), pn, qn, Xn)→ (t, x, v(t, x), p, q,X)} .
When v is an upper semi-continuous function on [0, T ] × Rd, we similarly dene the
parabolic super-jet J2,+v(t, x) and the parabolic limiting super-jet J̄2,+v(t, x) of v at
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd by
J2,+v(t, x) = −J2,(−v)(t, x), J̄2,+v(t, x) = −J̄2,(−v)(t, x).
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Then, we have the following result from [38]
Lemma 2.4.2 Let v : [0, T ]×Rd → R be a lower (resp. upper) semi-continuous function.
Then v is a viscosity super-solution (resp. sub-solution) to the Lower Isaacs (2.4) if and
only if





p− 〈b(t, x), q〉 − 1
2
tr[(σ>σ)(t, x)X]− f(t, x),
(v −Mv)(t, x)} , (v −Hv)(t, x)} ≥ 0 (≤ 0).
 for every x ∈ Rd we have
max {min {v(T, x)− g(x), (v −Mv)(T, x)} , (v −Hv)(T, x)} ≥ 0 (≤ 0).
An analogous statement hold for the UI equation (2.3).
Theorem 2.4.1 Let u and v be a bounded viscosity sub-solution and a bounded viscosity
super-solution to the LI equation (2.4) respectively and w be as in Lemma 2.4.1. Suppose
all the assumptions in the lemma hold, then, u ≤ v on [0, T ]× Rd.
Remarks 2.4.1 An analogous result can be proven for the UI case.
Proof 2.4.2 Let k be as in Lemma 2.4.1 and um be a viscosity sub-solution of the per-
turbed PDE (2.25). Here we will prove the inequality um ≤ v for any m ≥ 1 as we obtain
the desired result by letting m→∞ since u = limm→∞ um. To the contrary, we suppose
max[s,T ]×Rd um − v > 0 for some m ≥ 1 and shall get a contradiction. Then, there exists
(t̂, x̂) ∈ [s, T ]× Rd such that (um − v)(t̂, x̂) = θ > 0.
Case 1: t̂ ∈ [s, T ). Let r > 0, and introduce ũm(t, x) := ertum(t, x) and ṽ(t, x) :=
ertv(t, x). Then, they are viscosity sub and super-solution to




max{min{rW −Wt −AW − f̃ ,W − M̃W},W − H̃W} = 0
respectively, with f̃ := ertf , k̃ := ertk and
M̃W (t, x) = sup
δ∈∆
[W (t, x+ δ)− ertφ(x, δ)] H̃W (t, x) = inf
γ∈Γ
[W (t, x+ γ) + ertψ(x, γ)].
We note that the function ũm(t, x) − (t − t̂)2 − ṽ(t, x) takes the maximum θ̃ := ertθ and
(t̂, x̂) ∈ [s, T )× Rd is a unique maximum point. For each η > 0 we dene the function Φ
on [s, T ]×B(x̂, R)
2
for some R > 0 by
Φ(t, x, y) = ũm(t, x)− (t− t̂)2 −
1
2η
(x− y)2 − ṽ(t, y) (2.26)
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and let (tη, xη, yη) ∈ [s, T ]×B(x̂, R)
2
be a maximum point. We observe that the inequality
Φ(t̂, x̂, x̂) ≤ Φ(tη, xη, yη) implies




≤ ũm(tη, xη)− (tη − t̂)2 − ṽ(tη, yη). (2.27)
Since ũm and ṽ are bounded we have that |xη − yη| → 0 as η → 0. By compactness of
[s, T ] × B(x̂, R)
2
we see that (tηn , xηn , yηn) → (t̄, x̄, ȳ) ∈ [s, T ] × B(x̂0, R)
2
, as n → +∞,
for a suitable sequence (ηn)n converging to zero. Using (2.27) together with the semi-
continuity of ũm and ṽ we get
θ̃ ≤ ũm(t̄, x̄)− (t̄− t̂)2 − ṽ(t̄, ȳ).
Hence, we get (t̄, x̄) = (t̂, x̂) and (tη, xη, yη)→ (t̂, x̂, x̂) since (t̂, x̂) is the unique maximum
point of (2.26). Moreover, we obtain
ũm(t̂, x̂)− ṽ(t̂, x̂) ≤ lim inf
η→0





ũm(tη, xη)− lim inf
η→0




ũm(tη, xη)− lim sup
η→0
ṽ(tη, yη) = lim sup
η→0








ũm(tη, xη) = ũm(t̂, x̂) and lim
η→0
ṽ(tη, yη) = ṽ(t̂, x̂).
As (tη, xη, yη) → (t̂, x̂, x̂) ∈ [s, T )× B(x̂, R)2 we have that (tη, xη, yη) ∈ [s, T )× B(x̂, R)2








(xη − yη), Yη) ∈ J̄2,−(ṽ(tη, xη))
satisfying












where I denotes the identity matrix. Then, by sub and super-solution properties of ũm











tr[(σ>σ)(tη, xη)Xη]− f̃(tη, xη),
(ũm − M̃ũm)(tη, xη)
}














tr[(σ>σ)(tη, yη)Yη]− f̃(tη, yη),
(ṽ − M̃ṽ)(tη, yη)
}
, (ṽ − H̃ṽ)(tη, yη)
}
≥ 0




f̃(tη, yη), (ṽ − M̃ṽ)(tη, yη)} ≥ 0. This implies either






tr[(σ>σ)(tη, xη)Xη]− f̃(tη, xη) +
k̃
m






tr[(σ>σ)(tη, yη)Yη]− f̃(tη, yη),
or
(ũm − M̃ũm)(tη, xη) +
k̃
m
≤ (ṽ − M̃ṽ)(tη, yη).
We begin with the rst inequality
r(ũm(tη, xη)− ṽ(tη, yη)) ≤ 2(tη − t̂)−
1
η






(σ(tη, xη)− σ(tη, yη))>(σ(tη, xη)− σ(tη, yη))
]
+ f̃(tη, xη)− f̃(tη, yη)−
k̃
m
≤ 2(tη − t̂) +
K
η
(xη − yη)2 + f̃(tη, xη)− f̃(tη, yη)−
k̃
m
where K denotes a positive constant depending only on the Lipschitz constants of b and
σ. Letting η → 0 we obtain a contradiction.
Then, the second inequality implies
ũm(tη, xη)−ṽ(tη, yη) ≤ M̃ũm(tη, xη)−M̃ṽ(tη, yη)−
k̃
m
≤ ũm(tη, xη+δ∗)−ṽ(tη, yη+δ∗)−
k̃
m
where δ∗ is such that supδ[ũm(tη, xη+δ)−φ(xη, δ)] = ũm(tη, xη+δ∗)−φ(xη, δ∗). Therefore,
we get a contradiction by letting η → 0 as (t̂, x̂) is the unique global maximum of ũm− v.
Finally, when (ṽ − H̃ṽ)(tη, yη) ≥ 0 we have
(ũm − H̃ũm)(tη, xη) +
k̃
m
≤ (ṽ − H̃ṽ)(tη, yη)
which implies
ũm(tη, xη)−ṽm(tη, yη) ≤ H̃ũm(tη, xη)−H̃ṽ(tη, yη)−
k̃
m




where γ∗ is such that infγ[ṽ(tη, yη + γ) + ψ(yη, γ)] = ṽ(tη, yη + γ
∗) + ψ(yη, γ
∗). Similarly
to the case above, we get a contradiction by letting η → 0.
Case 2: t̂ = T . Here we have




max{min{(v − g)(T, x̂), (v −Mv)(T, x̂)}, (v −Hv)(T, x̂)} ≥ 0.
To conclude the proof we will show the contradiction when min{v−g, v−Mv} = v−g ≥ 0
as the other instances can be derived as in Case 1. Here we have




(um − v)(T, x̂) +
k
m
≤ 0 < θ = (um − v)(T, x̂) = max
x∈R
[um(T, x)− v(T, x)] .
Therefore, we have shown that max(t,x)∈[0,T ]×Rd(um − v)(t, x) ≤ 0 for all m ≥ 1. At
this point we only need to let m→∞ to complete the proof. 
We summarise all our founding in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.4.2 Under Assumptions 2.2.1-2.2.2 and assumptions in Lemma 2.4.1 we have
that V −(t, x) = l+(t, x) = l−(t, x) is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the Lower
Isaacs equation (2.4). Moreover, the lower value function V −, of the game where P2 has
priority, satises the DPP:

































∀ ρ ∈ Ts.
Similarly, we have that V +(t, x) = u+(t, x) = u−(t, x) is the unique continuous viscosity
solution of the Upper Isaacs equation (2.3) and it satises the DPP:

































∀ ρ ∈ Ts.
If the Isaacs condition (2.5) holds, then the game has a value regardless who has priority
of intervention and the value is
l− = V − = V = V + = u+.
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Proof 2.4.3 The DPP is due to the way u+, u−, l+ and l− are constructed since the
stochastic sub/super-solutions of the Lower/Upper Isaacs satisfy the corresponding half
DPP by denition. Apply Theorem 2.4.1 to v = l− and u = l+ so that l− ≥ l+. Then,
since l− ≤ l+ by construction (2.12), it follows that l− = l+. Similarly we get u− = u+.
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2.A Appendix of Chapter 2
The following propositions collect, for reader's convenience, two auxiliary results from
Bayraktar and Sîrbu [15, Proposition 4.1 and Lemma 4.1], which have been used in the
proofs of Section 2.3.
Proposition 2.A.1 Assume that (M,d) is a separable metric space (or less, a topological
space with a countable base) and G is a class of functions f : M → R ∪ {±∞}. Assume
also that each function in the class G is upper semi-continuous. Then, there exists a





f(x), for each x ∈M.
Moreover, let g : M → R ∪ {±∞}. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) g(x) = inf
f∈G
f(x), for each x ∈M ;
(ii) {x ∈M | g(x) < q} = ∪f∈G{x ∈M | f(x) < q}, for each q ∈ Q.
The next lemma is the result of a modication of Bayraktar and Sîrbu [16, Lemma 2.4]
and [15, Lemma 4.1].
Lemma 2.A.1 Let 0 < ξ′ < ξ and ε > 0. Moreover, let ϕ ∈ C1,2([s, T ] × Rd) and let
(t0, x0) be a local minimum of ϕ− u+ such that
ϕ− ξ ≥ u+ on Tε/2(t0, x0).
Then there exists a stochastic super-solution w ∈ U+ such that
ϕ− ξ′ ≥ w on Tε/2(t0, x0).
Proof 2.A.1 Using Lemma 2.3.1 and Proposition 2.A.1 we can choose a decreasing
sequence (wn)n≥1 ⊂ U+ of stochastic super-solutions such that wn ↓ u+. We denote by





We have that An+1 ⊆ An and ∩∞n=0An = ∅ since (wn)n is monotonically decreasing
converging pointwise to u+ and u+(t0, x0) = ϕ(t0, x0). In addition, since both wn and ϕ
are continuous, each An is closed. By compactness, we get that there exists an n0 ≥ 1
such that An0 = ∅, which means that
ϕ− ξ′ > wn0 , on Bε(t0, x0) \ {t0, x0}.
We now choose w := wn0 . 
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Chapter 3
Competition in dealer markets: an
impulse game approach
3.1 Introduction
The scope of this work is to study the strategical interaction between two dealers trading
to maximise their prots over a nite time horizon. In particular, the competition happens
via trade execution, meaning that, when they place an order, they can't just take into
account their own market impact as the one generated by their competitor has to be
considered as well. Optimal trading for singular agents has been widely studied since the
pioneering works by Bertsimas and Lo [23] and Almgren and Chriss [5] for the discrete
time case and Almgren [4] in continuous time. Then, many authors have built on top of
their models with various settings: discrete time [2, 14, 66, 69], continuous time impulse
controls [18, 20, 25, 59], continuous time trading rate control [19, 33] and continuous
time trading rate control with impulses [46, 66], the list of references is not exhaustive.
The extensions to situations with several competing traders have been researched since
Brunner and Pedersen's paper [28]. In particular, Bank et al. [7] studied a liquidity
model analysing the interactions between dealers, their clients and an end-users market,
Schied and Zhang [72] considered the case when N players try to optimally execute their
trades, Carlin et al. [32] worked on cooperative equilibria and when they break, Moallemi
[64] looked at asymmetry of information, and the list goes on. Moreover, there are many
papers on applications of mean eld games, see for instance Cardaliaguet and Lehalle [31]
on crowd trading with impulse controls and Jaimungal et al. [49] on optimal execution,
among others.
An important modelling choice when dealing with optimal trading regards market
impact, namely how the price process is aected by order sizes. We can divide the market
impact models available in two generations: according to the rst [4, 5, 23], market impact
has two components, one permanent, aecting the price of all current and future trades
equally, and one temporary, aecting only the price of the trade that triggered it. The
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second generation follows recent research in market microstructure, which has showed
that market impact is rather transient, see Bouchaud [26] and Taranto et al. [76, 77],
meaning that the eect of each trade on the price is temporary but long lasting, the price
process has long-memory. Hence, we will consider a model with transient price impact in
line with Obizhaeva and Wang [66], Gatheral et al. [46] and others.
In practice, dealers trade at discrete times, according to their strategies, facing some
xed and proportional costs, depending on the exchange they trade in, the order size and
the liquidity in the market. Given the context, it seems natural to opt for impulse controls
when choosing how to model players' trades as they are sequences of intervention times
and impulses [18, 20, 25, 31, 59]. In particular, in our game dealers trade placing Market
Orders, so that at each trading time they will send an order to buy or sell a certain number
of shares, the impulse, causing a market impact and hence, a cost proportional to its size,
as it is riding the limit order book to be fullled. Other ways proportional and xed costs
have been studied are stochastic control with viscosity solutions, dual approach based on
shadow prices in a frictionless market and asymptotics for vanishing costs, see [52, 71]
and references therein.
One challenge of stochastic dierential games with impulse controls is to manage the
case when players want to apply impulses at the same time. Indeed, in all existing works
there are only results in case one player has priority over the other, see [1, 9, 10, 38, 63].
Here we allow players to intervene simultaneously, to do so we provide a new system of
quasi-variational inequalities (QVIs) where at each trading time a static game is played.
This allows for a more realistic model, breaking one of the existing limits to the analysis
of stochastic dierential games with impulse controls.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 1 we formally dene the game and
discuss the property of the model. In Section 2 we provide a QVIs system and related
verication theorem to obtain equilibria where only one dealer trades at a time and we
show that we cannot nd any with this approach. In Section 3, after introducing a new
system of QVIs and related verication theorem to allow for simultaneous interventions,
we prove that there exists at least one equilibrium. In Section 4 we discuss interesting
areas for future research.
3.2 Game Setting
The Game. We consider a game in which two players, two dealer rms, compete over
a xed time period [0, T ]. The two dealers start the game with amount of shares x and
y respectively and want to maximise their revenues by time T . Both players are able to
observe the information ow, which we model by a ltration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ], satisfying the
usual conditions, on a given probability space (Ω,F ,P). We model trading using impulse
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controls, namely dealers place their order at some trading times τ i, i = 1, 2, at which they
trade the amount δi ∈ R, hence we will denote as ui := (τ in, δin)n≥1 the dealers' trading
strategies.
We assume that the unaected price process S0 evolves according to a Brownian
motion à la Bachelier (as in most of the literature on optimal execution/liquidation, see
[31, 33, 46]):
dS0t = b(t)dt+ σdWt, S
0
0 = s, (3.1)
for some initial value s ∈ R+, where b is deterministic and continuous and σ ≥ 0. One
drawback of such dynamics is that it would allow the price to be negative, regardless of
dealers' trades. This is justied in the literature as it does not happen for a reasonable
parameters choice and it would occur with negligible probability. Moreover, this model is
usually considered in short time horizon execution problems so that it is less likely that
the price will go negative, see Almgren and Chriss [5], Almgren [4] and Gatheral et al
[46].








with δin > 0 a sell order and δ
i
n < 0 a buy order.
Each trade creates some transient market impact and the aected price process in the







or similarly the Gatheral model [45]







where vt is the rate of trading, for a suitable decay kernel G. The most popular kernel
choices are G(t) = t−γ for 0 < γ < 1 and G(t) = e−ρt with ρ > 0, see Obizhaeva and
Wang, Gatheral et al. [46, 66]. Hence, we adopt a consistent adaptation to our trading













for some positive β > 0 and ρ > 0. Note that, the higher the β the worse the execution
price is going to be, meaning that a small β represents more liquid markets. Then, since
trading incurs in costs proportional to the order size due to market liquidity and the
eect of hitting the limit order book, it might not be optimal to play aggressively, i.e.
sell all the shares in one trade for example. Moreover, dealers have to choose the optimal
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trading frequency keeping account of inventory costs, which we will denote as γ > 0 for
the running inventory and Γ > 0 for the terminal inventory. Hence, players will maximise
their respective goal functionals:
J1(0, x, s;u1, u2) :=Ex,y,s
 ∑
n:0≤τ1n≤T





J2(0, y, s;u1, u2) :=Ex,y,s
 ∑
n:0≤τ2n≤T
δ2nSτ2n + STYT −
∫ T
0
γY 2t dt− ΓY 2T
 ,
where the subscripts in the expectations denote conditioning with respect to the starting
point. Notice that the payo functions depend on the other players' controls indirectly via
St. The inventory costs are quadratic to make up for some degree of inventory aversion,
as such the payo functions are linear quadratic as in [4, 19, 31, 33, 49].
The Strategies. As we mentioned in the game description, the dealers trade at some
suitably chosen trading times (τ in)n≥1 an amount of shares (δ
i
n)n≥1, where each δ
i
n is a
random variable with real values. This leads us to the following denition of strategies
for both players.







is a sequence of stopping times such that 0 ≤ τ i1 < τ i2 < . . . and limn→∞ τ in =∞ a.s., with
δin ∈ L0(Fn) for each n ≥ 1.We will refer to U as the set of strategies.
Before proceeding with the analysis we need to introduce the class of admissible strategies.




n)n ∈ U and u2 = (τ 2n, δ2n)n ∈ U , are admis-


















‖X‖∞, ‖Y ‖∞, ‖S‖∞ ∈ L2(Ω),
where ‖X‖∞ = supt∈[0,T ]|Xt|. We denote U the set of admissible strategies.




J1(0, x, y, s;u∗1;u
∗
2) ≥ J1(0, x, y, s;u1, u∗2) ∀u1 ∈ U,
J2(0, x, y, s;u∗1, u
∗
2) ≥ J2(0, x, y, s;u∗1, u2) ∀u2 ∈ U.
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3.3 No Simultaneous Trading Equilibria
In this section we adapt the arguments from [1] to obtain a suitable system of QVIs, which,
together with a verication theorem, will provide a framework to nd Nash equilibria
when only one dealer trades at a time. Finally, we will show how the restrictions to no
simultaneous trades turns out to be fatal as there are no candidate equilibrium payo
functions.




− βδin), recall δin > 0 is a sell order. Hence, Dealer 1's equilibrium payo function
satises at each intervention time τ
V 1(τ, x, y, s) = sup
δ1∈R
[
δ1(s− βδ1) + V 1(τ, x− δ1, y, s− βδ1)
]
,
as when he trades he does so maximising his returns. As such, we dene each player's
intervention operator accordingly
M1V 1(t, x, y, s) = sup
δ1∈R
[
δ1(s− βδ1) + V 1(t, x− δ1, y, s− βδ1)
]
,
M2V 2(t, x, y, s) = sup
δ2∈R
[
δ2(s− βδ2) + V 2(t, x, y − δ2, s− βδ2)
]
.
Moreover, since dealers' trades cannot increase the value of the game the value functions
have to satisfy
(V i −MiV i)(t, x, y, s) ≥ 0 (t, x, y, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3, i = 1, 2.
We are interested in Nash equilibria, according to which, one Dealer's equilibrium payo
function should not get worse when the other trades, in order to avoid deviations from
the equilibrium strategy. In mathematical terms, this translates to
V 1(t, x, y, s) = V 1(t, x, y − δ2, s− βδ2), V 2(t, x, y, s) = V 2(t, x− δ1, y, s− βδ1). (3.2)
Finally, for any V regular enough we can consider the innitesimal generator of the
uncontrolled state variable S:





where b, σ are as in (3.1). Given the information above, the system of QVIs to be satised
by the dealers' equilibrium payo functions has to be the following
(V i −MiV i)(t, x, y, s) ≥ 0 in [0, T ]× R3
V 1(t, x, y, s) = V 1(t, x, y − δ2, s− βδ2), in {(V 2 −M2V 2)(t, x, y, s) = 0}, (3.3a)
V 2(t, x, y, s) = V 2(t, x− δ1, y, s− βδ1), in {(V 1 −M1V 1)(t, x, y, s) = 0},
max{AV i + V it − γx2,MiV i − V i} = 0 in {(V j −MjV j)(t, x, y, s) > 0} ∩ [0, T )× R3,
(3.3b)
max{sx− Γx2 − V 1,M1V 1 − V 1} = 0 in {(V 2 −M2V 2)(t, x, y, s) > 0} ∩ {T} × R3,
(3.3c)
max{sy − Γy2 − V 2,M2V 2 − V 2} = 0 in {(V 1 −M1V 1)(t, x, y, s) > 0} ∩ {T} × R3.
The Verication Theorem
Theorem 3.3.1 Let V 1,2 : [0, T ]× R3 → R be two given functions. Assume that
{δ1(t, x, y, s)} ∈ argmax{V 1(t, x− δ1, y, s− βδ1)− δ1(s− βδ1)}, (t, x, y, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3,
{δ2(t, x, y, s)} ∈ argmax{V 2(t, x, y − δ2, s− βδ2)− δ2(s− βδ2)}, (t, x, y, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3,
hold and set Ci := {V i −MiV i > 0}. Moreover, assume that
 V 1, V 2 are solutions of the system of QVI;
 V i ∈ C1,0,0,2(Cj \ ∂Ci)∩C1,0,0,1(Cj)∩C0([0, T ]×R3) for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j and have at
most quadratic growth;
 ∂Ci is a Lipschitz surface and V i's second derivatives are locally bounded near ∂Ci
for i = 1, 2.
Finally, let (t, x, y, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3, (u∗1, u∗2) ∈ U where u∗i = (τ in, δin) i = 1, 2, are given by
τ 1n = inf{t > τ 1n−1 : (t,Xt, Yt, St) ∈ Cc1}, δ1n ∈ argmax{V 1(τ 1n, Xτ1n , Yτ1n , Sτ1n)− Sτ1nδ},
τ 2n = inf{t > τ 2n−1 : (t,Xt, , Yt, St) ∈ Cc2}, δ2n ∈ argmax{V 2(τ 2n, Xτ2n , Yτ2n , Sτ2n)− Sτ2nδ}




2) is a NE and V
1(t, x, y, s) = J1(t, x, y, s;u∗1, u
∗
2),
V 2(t, x, y, s) = J2(t, x, y, s;u∗1, u
∗
2).
Proof 3.3.1 We do the proof for V 1 only since the steps for V 2 are the same.
Let V 1(t, x, y, s) = J1(t, x, y, s;u∗1, u
∗
2). Step 1: we have to prove that V
1(t, x, y, s) ≥
J1(t, x, y, s;u1, u
∗
2) for all u1 : (u1, u
∗
2) ∈ U. Thanks to regularity assumptions plus ap-
proximation arguments as in [1], we can assume without loss of generality that V 1 ∈
C1,0,0,2(C2) ∩ C0([0, T )× R3). Then, x r ≥ 0 and dene the stopping time
τr,T := T ∧ τr,
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where τr := inf{t > 0 : St /∈ B(s, r)} is the exit time from the ball with radius r and centre
s, with the convention inf ∅ = +∞. We apply Itô's formula to V (t,Xt, Yt, St) between
time 0 and τr,T and take conditional expectation on both sides
V 1(0, x, y, s) =Ex,y,s
[
V 1(τr,T , Xτr,T , Yτr,T , Sτr,T )−
∫ τr,T
0





V 1(τ ik−, Xτ ik−, Yτ ik−, Sτ ik−)− V
1(τ ik, Xτ ik , Yτ ik , Sτ ik)
) .
First, let's note that∫ τr,T
0
(AV 1 + V 1t )(t,Xt, Yt, St)dt =
∫ τr,T
0
(AV 1 + V 1t )(t,Xt, Yt, St)1{V 2>MV 2}dt
as from (3.3a) ∫ τr,T
0






(AV 1 + V 1t )(t,Xt, Yt, St)1{V 2=MV 2}dt = 0.
Then, from (3.3b) we get
(AV 1 + V 1t )(t,Xt, Yt, St) ≤ γX2t
and
V 1(τ 1k , Xτ1k−, Yτ1k−, Sτ1k−) ≥M
1V 1(τ 1k , Xτ1k−, Yτ1k−, Sτ1k−)
≥ V (τ 1k , Xτ1k , Yτ1k , Sτ1k ) + δ
1
kSτ1k .
Therefore, we can rewrite the previous inequality as
V 1(0, x, y, s) ≥ Ex,y,s







By polynomial growth assumptions we have
V 1(τr,T , Xτr,T , Yτr,T , Sτr,T ) ≤ C(1 + |Xτr,T |2 + |Yτr,T |2 + |Sτr,T |2)
≤ C(1 + ‖X‖2∞ + ‖Y ‖2∞ + ‖S‖2∞) ∈ L1
for some C > 0. Then, we apply the dominated convergence theorem and pass to the
limit as r →∞. Finally, because of the terminal condition (3.3c) we have






γX2t dt+ STXT − ΓX2T
 = J1(0, x, y, s;u1, u∗2).
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Step 2: the equality follows by properties of u∗1. In particular by
τ 1n = inf{t > τ 1n−1 : (t,Xt, Yt, St) ∈ Cc1}, δ1n ∈ argmax{V 1(τ 1n, Xτ1n , Yτ1n , Sτ1n)− Sτ1nδ},
thanks to which, from (3.3b) we get
(AV 1 + V 1t )(t,Xt, Yt, St) = γX2t ,
V 1(τ 1k−, Xτ1k−, Yτ1k−, Sτ1k−) =M
1V 1(τ 1k−, Xτ1k−, Yτ1k−, Sτ1k−).
Therefore, we are able to substitute the inequalities in step 1 with equalities to get the
desired result. 
No equilibria with no-simultaneous trades. In the following we will show that in
case simultaneous interventions are not allowed we are not able to nd any Nash equilibria
with this QVIs approach when the solution of the PDE is of quadratic form. The system
of QVIs suggests that our candidates have the form
W 1(t, x, y, s) =

ϕ1(t, x, s) (t, x, y, s) ∈ C1 ∩ C2
ϕ1(t, x− δ∗1, s− βδ∗1) + δ∗1(s− βδ∗1) (t, x, y, s) ∈ Cc1
ϕ1(t, x, s− βδ∗2) (t, x, y, s) ∈ Cc2
W 2(t, x, y, s) =

ϕ2(t, y, s) (t, x, y, s) ∈ C1 ∩ C2
ϕ2(t, y − δ∗2, s− βδ∗2) + δ∗2(s− βδ∗2) (t, x, y, s) ∈ Cc2
ϕ2(t, y, s− βδ∗1) (t, x, y, s) ∈ Cc1
where ϕ1, ϕ2 are the solution to the PDEs
Aϕ1 + ϕ1t − γx2 = 0, ϕ1(T, x, s) = sx− Γx2, (3.4)
Aϕ2 + ϕ2t − γy2 = 0, ϕ2(T, y, s) = sy − Γy2, (3.5)
and δ∗1, δ
∗
2 are the equilibrium impulses. First, we notice that functions of the following
form are solutions to (3.4)-(3.5):
ϕ1(t, x, s) = C1s+ C2(T − t) + C3, ϕ2(t, y, s) = K1s+K2(T − t) +K3;
so that, solving for the boundary conditions we get
ϕ1(t, x, s) = sx+ (bx− γx2)(T − t)− Γx2, ϕ2(t, y, s) = sy + (by − γy2)(T − t)− Γy2.
Here comes the critical point. Assume Dealer 1 trades at τ ∈ [0, T ], then, in order to
have a Nash equilibrium, Dealer 2 should not get worse, otherwise he would deviate, this
means that
ϕ2(τ, Yτ , Sτ ) = ϕ
2(τ, Yτ−, Sτ−).
Since, only Dealer 1 is trading we have Yτ = Yτ− and Sτ = Sτ− − βδ1. Hence, rewriting
the equality above we get




showing that anytime one of the two dealers will trade the other would deviate. This
means we are not able to nd any equilibria under this approach, although some equilibria
may still exist.
3.4 Equilibria with Simultaneous Trading
In this section we provide an alternative QVIs system and related verication theorem in
order to nd Nash equilibria where dealers can trade at the same time. Finally, we solve
the new QVIs system and apply the verication theorem to nd Nash equilibria.
The QVIs system. In order to have simultaneous interventions we need to introduce
dierent operators from the ones used in the previous section. To begin with, instead of
dealing with players' trading times we will consider intervention times at which at least
one of the two dealers is buying or selling the stock. This approach will lead to a similar
but dierent system of QVIs.
According to this framework at trading times the dealers are playing a static nonzero-
sum game. Hence, we introduce the Nash operator N such that, for any V := (V 1, V 2),
NV (t, x, y, s) returns the set of all Nash equilibria payos of the static game in (t, x, y, s) ∈
[0, T ]× R3, which we denote by ν = (ν1, ν2), where dealers maximise
V 1(t, x− δ1, y − δ2, s− β(δ1 + δ2)) + δ1(s− β(δ1 + δ2))
V 2(t, x− δ1, y − δ2, s− β(δ1 + δ2)) + δ2(s− β(δ1 + δ2))
respectively. Given the information above, the system of QVIs to be satised by the deal-
ers' equilibrium payo functions has to be the following. Let ν = (ν1, ν2) be a measurable
selector of NV , i.e. ν : [0, T ]×R3 → R2 measurable such that ν(t, x, y, s) ∈ NV (t, x, y, s)
for all (t, x, y, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3
V − ν ≥ 0 in [0, T ]× R3
max{AV 1 + V 1t − γx2, ν1 − V 1} = 0 in [0, T ]× R3 (3.6a)
max{AV 2 + V 2t − γy2, ν2 − V 2} = 0 in [0, T ]× R3
max{sx− Γx2 − V 1, ν1 − V 1} = 0 in {T} × R3 (3.6b)
max{sy − Γy2 − V 2, ν2 − V 2} = 0 in {T} × R3.
Note that νi−V i coincide withMV i−V i in case the other player is passive, δj = 0, j 6= i,
whereas it coincides with (3.2) whether he is passive, δi = 0 while the other dealer is
trading, δj 6= 0, i 6= j.
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The Verication Theorem
Theorem 3.4.1 Let V 1,2 : [0, T ] × R3 be two given functions. Let NV be a non-empty
compact-valued correspondence. Then, there exists a measurable selector ν ∈ NV . Set
C := {V − ν > 0} and Cc ≡ {V − ν = 0} and assume that
 V 1, V 2 are strong solutions of the system of QVIs (3.6);
 V i ∈ C1,0,0,2(C) ∩ C0([0, T ]× R3) for i, j = 1, 2 and have at most quadratic growth;
Finally, let (t, x, y, s) ∈ [0, T ]×R3, (u∗1, u∗2) ∈ U where u∗i = (τn, δin), i = 1, 2, are given by
τn = inf{t > τn−1 : (t,Xt, Yt, St) ∈ Cc},
and {δn} = {(δ1n, δ2n)} are such that V (τn−, Xτn−, Yτn−, Sτn−) = ν(τn, Xτn , Yτn , Sτn) with




2) is a NE and V
1(t, x, y, s) = J1(t, x, y, s;u∗1, u
∗
2),
V 2(t, x, y, s) = J2(t, x, y, s;u∗1, u
∗
2).
Proof 3.4.1 First we have to prove existence of a measurable selector ν ∈ NV . Recall
NV (t, x, y, s) : ([0, T ]× R3,B([0, T ]× R3))  R2, where B is the Borel σ-algebra and 
is used to distinguish a correspondence, or set-valued function, from a function. Since
([0, T ] × R3,B([0, T ] × R3)) is a measurable space, R2 is a metrizable space and NV
is non-empty with compact values, then NV is also measurable by Theorem 18.10 in
[3]. Moreover, since R2 is a Polish space, by the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection
Theorem (Theorem 18.13 [3]) there exists a measurable selector ν ∈ NV .
We do the proof for V 1 only since the steps for V 2 are the same. Let V 1(t, x, y, s) =
J1(t, x, y, s;u∗1, u
∗
2). We have to prove that V
1(t, x, y, s) ≥ J1(t, x, y, s;u1, u∗2) for all u1 :
(u1, u
∗
2) ∈ U. Then, x r ≥ 0 and dene the stopping time
τr,T := T ∧ τr
with τr := inf{t > 0 : St /∈ B(s, r)} with the convention inf ∅ = +∞. We apply Ito's
formula to V (t,Xt, Yt, St) between time 0 and τr,T and take conditional expectation on
both sides gives
V 1(0, x, y, s) =Ex,y,s
[
V 1(τr,T , Xτr,T , Yτr,T , Sτr,T )−
∫ τr,T
0





V 1(τk−, Xτk−, Yτk−, Sτk−)− V 1(τk, Xτk , Yτk , Sτk)
) .
From (3.6a) we get
(AV 1 + V 1t )(t,Xt, Yt, St) ≤ γX2t
and
V 1(τk, Xτk−, Yτk−, Sτk−) ≥ ν1(τk, Xτk−, Yτk−, Sτk−) = V 1(τk, Xτk , Yτk , Sτk) + δ1kSτk .
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Therefore, we can rewrite the previous inequality as
V 1(0, x, y, s) ≥ Ex,y,s







By quadratic growth assumptions we have
V 1(τr,T , Xτr,T , Yτr,T , Sτr,T ) ≤ C(1 + |Xτr,T |2 + |Yτr,T |2 + |Sτr,T |2)
≤ C(1 + ‖X‖2∞ + ‖Y ‖2∞ + ‖S‖2∞) ∈ L1
for some C > 0. Then, we apply the dominated convergence theorem and pass to the
limit as r →∞. To conclude this step, because of the terminal condition (3.6b) we have






γX2t dt+ STXT − ΓX2T
]
= J1(0, x, y, s;u1, u
∗
2).
Now we obtain the desired equality by properties of u∗1. According to it we have that
(δ1n, δ
2
n) is a Nash equilibrium of the static game played at each trading time, i.e.
V 1(τk, Xτk−, Yτk−, Sτk−) = V
1(τk, Xτk , Yτk , Sτk) + δ
1
kSτk .
Hence, by (3.6a) we get
(AV 1 + V 1t )(t,Xt, Yt, St) = γX2t ,
form which we obtain V 1(t, x, y, s) = J1(t, x, y, s;u∗1, u
∗
2) following the same steps as above.

The Equilibrium Candidates. In order to nd Nash equilibria, we rst need to nd
some suitable candidates via solving the QVIs system. Once they are identied, we
apply Theorem 3.4.1 to verify that they are indeed Nash equilibria. We begin looking for
equilibria for long-short dealers to later analyse the long-only case. Let's rst write the
system of QVIs we want to solve. Let ν = (ν1, ν2) ∈ NW
W − ν ≥ 0 in [0, T ]× R3
max{AW 1 +W 1t − γx2, ν1 −W 1} = 0 in [0, T ]× R3
max{AW 2 +W 2t − γy2, ν2 −W 2} = 0 in [0, T ]× R3
max{sx− Γx2 −W 1, ν1 −W 1} = 0 in {T} × R3
max{sy − Γy2 −W 2, ν2 −W 2} = 0 in {T} × R3.
A careful look at the QVIs system suggests the following functional form for the solution
W 1(t, x, y, s) =
{
ϕ1(t, x, s) (t, x, y, s) ∈ C1
ν1(t, x, y, s) (t, x, y, s) ∈ Cc1
W 2(t, x, y, s) =
{
ϕ2(t, y, s) (t, x, y, s) ∈ C2
ν2(t, x, y, s) (t, x, y, s) ∈ Cc2
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where ϕ1, ϕ2 are the solution to (3.4)-(3.5), ν = (ν1, ν2) is such that
ν1(t, x, y, s) = ϕ
1(t, x− δ∗1, s∗) + δ∗1s∗, ν2(t, x, y, s) = ϕ2(t, y − δ∗2, s∗) + δ∗2s∗,
with δ∗1 and δ
∗
2 the equilibrium impulses, s
∗ = s− β(δ∗1 + δ∗2) and C1, C2 such that:
C1 : = {(t, x, y, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3 : ϕ1(t, x, s)− ϕ1(t, x− δ∗1, s∗) + δ∗1s∗ > 0},
C2 : = {(t, x, y, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3 : ϕ2(t, y, s)− ϕ2(t, y − δ∗2, s∗) + δ∗2s∗ > 0}.
As in the case with no simultaneous interventions in the previous section, we get
ϕ1(t, x, s) = sx+ (bx− γx2)(T − t)− Γx2, ϕ2(t, y, s) = sy + (by − γy2)(T − t)− Γy2
since the PDEs are identical.
Static Nash Equilibrium. Now we look for Nash equilibria in the static games played
at trading times. We start nding Dealer 1's best response:
max
δ1∈R
[s− β(δ1 + δ2)]x+
[
b(x− δ1)− γ(x− δ1)2
]
(T − t)− Γ(x− δ1)2.
The rst order condition gives us:
−βx− b(T − t) + 2γ(x− δ1)(T − t) + 2Γ(x− δ1) = 0.
So, Dealer 1's optimal trade is
δ1 = x−
βx+ b(T − t)
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]
(3.7)
as the second derivative is negative. Symmetrically, Dealer 2's best response is
δ2 = y −
βy + b(T − t)
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]
. (3.8)
Moreover, as they do not depend on each other they are equilibrium strategies of the
static game. Notice that the position held by the dealers after each trading time τ is
Xτ = Xτ− − δ∗1 =
βXτ− + b(T − t)
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]
, Yτ = Yτ− − δ∗2 =
βYτ− + b(T − t)
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]
, (3.9)
showing that the dealers' holding are decreasing in the inventory costs γ,Γ, increasing in
the market impact, β, as it makes them send smaller orders, whereas the impact of the
trend, b, on their holdings is decreasing in time. Moreover, it is important to notice that,
in case dealers start the game from long positions X0 = x, Y0 = y ≥ 0, then, from (3.9),
they will never go short, namely Xt, Yt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], if the trend is positive, b ≥ 0.
Finally, we derive both dealers' continuation regions C1, C2
C1 = {(t, x, y, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3 : βxδ2 − [γ(T − t) + Γ]δ21 > 0},
C2 = {(t, x, y, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3 : βyδ1 − [γ(T − t) + Γ]δ22 > 0}.
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Application of the verication theorem (work in progress). Now we verify un-
der which conditions dealers trading according to (3.7)-(3.8) is a Nash equilibrium. To
begin with, we can note that our candidates W1,W2 satisfy the regularity properties by
construction (quadratic growth and W i ∈ C1,0,0,2(C)∩C0([0, T ]×Rd)). Then, we need to
check that δ∗1 and δ
∗
2 are equilibrium strategies of the static game played at trading times:
ϕ1(t, x− δ∗1, s− β(δ∗1 + δ∗2)) + δ∗1(s− β(δ∗1 + δ∗2))
≥ ϕ1(t, x− δ1, s− β(δ1 + δ∗2)) + δ1(s− β(δ1 + δ∗2))
ϕ2(t, y − δ∗2, s− β(δ∗1 + δ∗2)) + δ∗2(s− β(δ∗1 + δ∗2))
≥ ϕ2(t, y − δ2, s− β(δ∗1 + δ2)) + δ2(s− β(δ∗1 + δ2)),
for all δ1, δ2 ∈ R, which is satised as δ∗1 is a maximum point of ϕ1(t, x − δ1, s − β(δ1 +
δ∗2)) + δ1(s− β(δ1 + δ∗2)) (analogously δ∗2).
It remains to show that we have W −NW ≥ 0 everywhere so that W = (W1,W2) is a
solution to the system as the remaining conditions follow by construction. Fundamentally,
we want to verify that {W1 − υ1 > 0} ≡ {W2 − υ2 > 0} as the continuation region is
{W − NW > 0} and the intervention region is {W − NW = 0}. To do so, let's dene
ξ1 := W1−υ1 and ξ2 := W2−υ2. We want to have ξ1 = kξ2, with k > 0. First, let's write
ξ1 and ξ2 explicitly
ξ1 = βxδ2 − [γ(T − t) + Γ]δ21
ξ2 = βyδ1 − [γ(T − t) + Γ]δ22.
Hence, we want to nd under which conditions we have
βxδ2 − [γ(T − t) + Γ]δ21 = k{βyδ1 − [γ(T − t) + Γ]δ22}.
Plugging in (3.7) and (3.8) we get
2βx{2y[γ(T − t) + Γ]− βy − b(T − t)} − {2x[γ(T − t) + Γ]− βx− b(T − t)}2 =
k
{
2βy{2x[γ(T − t) + Γ]− βx− b(T − t)} − {2y[γ(T − t) + Γ]− βy − b(T − t)}2
}
which we can rewrite as
{4βxy[γ(T − t) + Γ]− 2β2xy}(1− k)− 4bβ(T − t)(x− ky)− 4[γ(T − t) + Γ]2(x2 − ky2)
− β2(x2 − ky2)− b2(T − t)2(1− k) + 4β[γ(T − t) + Γ](x2 − ky2)
+ 4b(T − t)[γ(T − t) + Γ](x− ky) = 0.
Notice that we need to x k = 1 as one of the conditions to let the equality hold. Now
we x k = 1, divide by (x− y) and rewrite the equation
− 4bβ(T − t)− 4[γ(T − t) + Γ]2(x+ y)− β2(x+ y)
+ 4β[γ(T − t) + Γ](x+ y) + 4b(T − t)[γ(T − t) + Γ] = 0.
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To nally nd the conditions we need to collect the terms in x, y, t:
− 4b(T − t)(β − Γ)− 4γ2(x+ y)(T − t)2 + 4γ(x+ y)(T − t)(β − 2Γ)
− (x+ y)(β − 2Γ)2 + 4bγ(T − t)2 = 0
which is satised under the following
 β = 2Γ, γ = 0, and b = 0, which means no-one is trading as δ∗1 = δ
∗
2 = 0.
 x = y as we have divided earlier by x− y,
 x = −y and b = 0, which means the dealers are making the market to each other
as this condition implies δ∗1 = −δ∗2 so that x = −y holds for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Now it is left to be shown that once dealers trade they enter the continuation region C,
avoiding potentially innitely many trades in one instant.
We begin focusing on the case x = −y with b = 0. Here C writes:
C =
{
(t, x,−x, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3 : −βxδ1 − [γ(T − t) + Γ]δ21 > 0
}
.
We are interested in the inequality which, after plugging in (3.7) and some manipulations,
can be represented as
{β2 − 4[γ(T − t) + Γ]}x2 > 0.
So that, we can write the continuation region as
C =
{
(t, x,−x, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3 : (T − t) < β − 2Γ
2γ
, x 6= 0
}
as T − t ≥ 0 and −β+2Γ
2γ
< 0. For C to be non-empty and such that there is trading we
need 2(γT + Γ) > β > 2Γ. Under this regime both dealers trade at the very rst time
t = 0, liquidate their positions as δ∗1 = x according to (3.7) and then don't trade any
more, as the equilibrium trade is now equal to zero.
Regarding the perfectly symmetric case, x = y, we have
C =
{
(t, x, x, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3 : βxδ1 − [γ(T − t) + Γ]δ21 > 0
}
,
whose inequality, substituting (3.7), rewrites
βx
(
x− βx+ b(T − t)
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]
)
− [γ(T − t) + Γ]
(
x− βx+ b(T − t)
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]
)
> 0.
After some computations we get the more usable form
{{2[γ(T − t) + Γ]− β}x− b(t− t)} {{2[γ(T − t) + Γ]− 3β}x− b(t− t)} < 0. (3.10)
Therefore, dealers potentially hit the trading region in two curves
x̃1(t) =
b(T − t)




2[γ(T − t) + Γ]− 3β
. (3.12)
Below we analyse how dealers trades when they hit the curves above.
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1. Hitting x̃1. First, plugging (3.4) into (3.9), we nd that holdings after the trade
haven't changed and δ1 = 0.
2. Hitting x̃2. Similarly, we nd that after trading Dealer 1 owns
x∗(t) =
b(T − t)
γ(T − t) + Γ
.
Now, to understand the trading behaviour we need to study the inequality (3.10).
 if Γ > 3
2
β and b > 0 (if b < 0 change the order of x̃1, x̃2) the continuation region is
C =
{
(t, x, x, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3 : x̃1(t) < x < x̃2(t)
}
.
In order to avoid innitely many trades we need to make sure x∗ is in C, which
means we need
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]− 3β < γ(T − t) + Γ < 2[γ(T − t) + Γ]− β, (3.13)
which holds whenever γ and T are such that γT+Γ < 3β. For instance, X0 = x ∈ C,
β ∈ R, Γ = 2β, γ = β/2 and T = 1 is an equilibrium.




(t, x, x, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3 : x̃2(t) < x < x̃1(t)
}
.
Similarly, we need (3.13) to hold, we need Γ > β which is not compatible with
β > 2[γT + Γ], hence, no equilibria.
 if 2Γ > β and 2(γT + Γ) < 3β and b > 0 (if b < 0 change the order of x̃1, x̃2) the
continuation region assume a counter-intuitive shape:
C =
{
(t, x, x, s) ∈ [0, T ]× R3 : x < x̃2(t), x > x̃1(t)
}
,
as dealers don't trade when they have very long or very short positions, which they
hold until maturity as x̃i(t)→ 0 as t→ T for all i = 1, 2, so that near maturity we
have that the continuation region is very close to the whole space [0, T ] × R3. In
this case, we can only force x∗ > x̃1 as x
∗ ≥ 0 and x̃2 ≤ 0 when b ≥ 0, analogously
when b < 0. Then, x∗ > x̃1 holds when Γ > β. One instance of equilibrium in this
setting is X0 = x̃2, Γ = β + ε and β > 2γT + 2ε for any ε > 0. Notice that, if we
pick any X0 = x ∈ C there won't be trades as the intervention region is shrinking
with time.
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3.5 Work in Progress.
Generalising the current setting. As we understand that a perfectly symmetric set-
ting where both dealers have the same risk aversion/inventory costs we would like to
consider a setting in which we allow for dierent coecients, namely γ1 ≥ γ2 and Γ1 ≥ Γ2
instead of γ and Γ.
Mixed Strategies. One very interesting change would be to allow dealers to play at
each trading time a mixed strategy instead of a pure one. To do so we would need to
rearrange the denition of strategies, for instance we could dene them as follows. Let's
denote P(R) the space of probability measures on R, equipped with the weak convergence
topology.







sequence of stopping times such that 0 ≤ τ i1 < τ i2 < . . . and limn→∞ τ in = ∞ a.s., with
∆in ∈ L0(Fn) taking values in P(R) for each n ≥ 1. We denote U the players' set of
strategies.
In this setting dealers would maximise∫ ∫ (
V 1(t, x− δ1, y − δ2, s− β(δ1 + δ2)) + δ1(s− β(δ1 + δ2))
)
∆1(dδ1)∆2(dδ2)∫ ∫ (
V 2(t, x− δ1, y − δ2, s− β(δ1 + δ2)) + δ2(s− β(δ1 + δ2))
)
∆1(dδ1)∆2(dδ2).
Once we suitably adapt the verication theorem we have access to a big pool of candidates.
For instance, below we consider the case when dealers trade according to a Poisson, a
Uniform or a Normal distribution.






b(x− λ)− γ(x2 − 2xλ+ λ+ λ2)
]
(T − t)−Γ(x2−2xλ+λ+λ2)2.
Then the rst order condition would give us
βx+ [−b− γ(−2x+ 1 + 2λ)](T − t)− Γ(−2x+ 1 + 2λ) = 0,
from which we derive the equilibrium rate, as it does not depend on the other dealer's
trades:
λ = x− 1
2
− βx− b(T − t)
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]
.
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Uniform mixing. Now we allow Dealer 1 to mix according to a Uniform(x, x). Hence,


























(T − t)− Γ
(


































from which we get
2
3
(x+ x) = x− βx− b(T − t)
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]
.
Similarly, the FOC for x returns
2
3
(x+ x) = x− βx− b(T − t)
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]
,





x− βx− b(T − t)
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]
}
, x = x− βx− b(T − t)
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]
.
Normal mixing. When a dealer chose to mix according to a Normal(µ, σ2) distribution,





b(x− µ)− γ(x2 − 2xµ+ µ2 + σ2)
]
(T−t)−Γ(x2−2xµ+µ2 +σ2).
The FOCs in µ and σ return:
µ = x− βx− b(T − t)
2[γ(T − t) + Γ]
, −2[γ(T − t) + Γ]σ2 = 0,
resulting in the pure strategy (3.7).
All the examples above show that, once everything is suitably adapted to allow for
mixing strategies, it will be possible to look for way more candidates. For instance, as any
of the strategies above don't depend on the other dealer's one, it is possible to look for
equilibria when one dealer is playing a pure strategy while the other is playing a mixed
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